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The causes  of tax avoidance,  of tax evasion,  and  of the failure  to
reach full revenue  potential  from road user taxes lie within tax
- structures  and administrations  - and those are the areas that
need reform.
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This paper-  a product  of the Transport  Division,  Infrastructure  and Urban  Development  Department-
is part  of a larger  departmental  projeet  on  pricing,  cost recovery,  and  efficient  resource  use in the road sub-
sector. The report  is based on a series  of case  studies  carried  out in Argentina,  Bolivia,  Ghana, India,  and
Yugoslavia  - drawing  also  on studies  carried  out in Indonesia,  Nepal,  and Tanzania.  Copies  of this paper
are  available  free  from  the  World  Bank,  1818  H Street  NW,  Washington  DC  20433. Please  contact  Jemifer
Francis-O'Conmor,  room S10-063,  extension  35205  (46 pages).
After studying  the problems  of administering  adminritration  narrows  the possibility  for
road user taxes in 19  developing  countries,  Bahl  successful  evasion,  the result  may be an increase
reports  the following,  among  other things:  in avoidance.
*  There is no single,  correct  structure  for  *  The four main types of road user charges
road user taxation  since the various  charges  may  are (1) fuel tax, (2) sales tax, excise tax, and
play  different  roles in different  national  revenue  import duty, (3) annual  license and vehicle
systems.  registration  charges,  and (4) tolls.
*  All effective  tax administration  requires  *  Action  should  be taken  under all four
a solid, uncomplicated  tax structure.  main reform  options (1) to keep rate levels as
*  The substantial  revenue  potential  of road  low as possible,  (2) to broaden  the tax base, limit
user taxation  rests on a growing  tax base. De-  exemptions,  and move  toward a single  uniform
spite this, road user taxation  remains an  tax rate, (3) to simplify  taxes  to minimize
underused  source  of public finance  in developing  ambiguity,  ease administration,  reduce  adminis-
countries.  trative cost, and lower the compliance  cost, and
*  Tax evasion  and avoidance  narrow  the  (4) to improve  tax enforcement  by improving  tax
tax base, cost governments  revenue,  and compro-  collection, record-keeping,  liability assessment,
mise  the efficiency  and redistribution  objectives  and identification  of those liable  to pay the tax.
of a tax system. Evasion  may occur  by  *  Transport  fuel  pricing needs to be better
nonfiling,  underreporting,  or smuggling. It  coordinated,  and rate structures  - especially  for
generally  increases  with the tax rates (particu-  sales tax, excise tax, and import  duty - could be
lady the marginal  tax rates) and decreases  with a  lowered  and made more  uniform. In some
greater  probability  of detection  and with a more  countries  there is scope  for raising fuel  tax and
severe  penalty.  Avoidance  is the result  of  the annual  license tax, provided  it is accompa-
loopholes  in a tax system that enable a taxpayer  nied  by better enforcement.  Evidence  found  in
to reduce  liability by adjusting  the consumption  the case studies  for this paper  have not supported
or composition  of received  income,  or by making  an incentives  argument:  that taxpayers  will be
different investment  or production  choices.  more  inclined  to pay if they see a direct benefit
*  The problems  of evasion  and avoidance  between  tax and spending.
must be approached  simultanteously.  If a tax
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VAT  Value Added TaxEXECTIVE  SUMMARY
i.  The following chapters are based on research into the problems ; 1 f road usor tax
administration  In 19 developing  countries. The introduction  posits three concepts  that underlie
the work.  First,  there is no single, correct structure for road user taxation since the various
charges may play different roles in any national revenue system.  Second, all effective tax
administration  requires a solid, uncomplicated  tax structure. Third, the revenue potential  of road
user taxation  is not only substantial,  but rests on a growing tax base. In spite of this, road user
taxation remains an under-used source of public finance in less developed  countries.
General Background
ii.  Parts I and II place road user taxation in the context of the broader fiscal problems
facing developing  countries.  These problems include debt burdens, high inflation, budgetary
imbalances, deficient  public services, high marginal tax rates, and varying rates of economic
growth.  Contributing  to these are tax evasion and tax avoidance. The most frequent response
to revenue shortfalls  in developing  countries  is to use increased  customs  duties, higher sales and
excise tax rates, and highly progressive income tax structures. All of these are thought to have
a negative economic impact and to incite non-compliance  with the tax system.
iin.  Evasion  and  avoidance narrow  the  tax  base,  cost  govermments  revenue, and
compromise  the efficiency  and redistribution  objectives  of a tax system. Evasion may  occur by
non-filing,  under-reporting,  or smuggling. It generally  increases  with the tax rates (particularly
the marginal tax rates), and decreases with a greater probability of detection and with a more
severe penalty.  Avoidance  is the result of loopholes  in a tax system that enable a taxpayer to
reduce liability by adjusting  the consumption  or composition  of received  income, or by maling
different investment  or production choices.
iv.  The problems of evasion and avoidance  need to be approached simultaneously. If a
tax administration  greatly narrows the possibility for successful  evasion, the result may be an
increase in  avoidance.  Strategies to  improve tax administration and  reduce evasion and
avoidance  center on:  (1) lowering marginal tax rates; (2) broadening  tax bases by eliminating
exemptions  and many preferential treatments;  (3) increasing  the transaction  cost for using legal
loopholes; (4) tightening the control of the tax authority and monitoring questionable  cases;
(5) discouraging under-reporting by  using presumptive assessments and  regular  audits;
(6) preparing a full tax roil and reducing compliance cost; and (7) increasing penalty rates,
discouraging  negotiated  settlements  and tax amnesties,  and increasing  (government)  willingness
to prosecute.
Road Transport  Taxation
v.  Transport taxes are divided into two broad categories - general revenue taxes and
road user charges.  The former are levied on transport related activities as part of national
revenue policy, while the latter are differentially  higher taxes levied on the transport sector.
Part m focuses on the four main sets of road user charges:  (1) fuel tax; (2) sales tax, exciseii
tax, and import  duty; (3) annual  license  and vehicle  registration  charges;  and (4) tolls. Withn
each  of these  are many  types  of specific  levies.
vi.  Fuel tax.  Fiel tax is the dominant  source  of revenue  received  from the transport
sector, often  accounting  for half of all transport  related  revenues. The attraction  of fuel tax is
that it has a large tax base that grows in propoidon  to GDP, is relatively  price inelastic  in
demand,  and is easily  administered  with  relatively  few  distributors  and few  points  of distributeJn
(fuel  tax may  be income  elastic  if a specific  (per  gallon)  tax rate  is not levied  and  if governments
do not allow the taxable  price to increase  with the market  price)). The taxpayer  is  aily
identified,  compliance  is easily  monitored,  and levels  of evasion  and avoW  ince  are low. Fuel
tax, however,  is not usually  designed  as a proportional  benefits  levy. The  relationship  between
total collection  and total road expenditure  varies widely.  Fuel is taxed in several  ways.
Imported  petroleum  is subject  to customs  duty;  domestic  refineries  are subject  to excise  tax; the
state  monopoly  on  petroleum  products  may  be taxed  on its retained  earnings;  retail  sales  tax may
be imposed  on the pump  price; and the pump  price may be set above  (below)  production  cost,
implying  a tax (subsidy).  Some countries  use one of these tax forms and others use a
comoination.  The aim of fuel rate differentiation  centers  on income  distribution,  subsidizing
public  transportation,  keeping  prices  for non-transport  fuel use low,  and encouraging  industrial
development.  However,  differential  fuel prices  between  contiguous  countries  and alternative
transport  fuels  will encourage  evasion  and avoidance. Gasoline  users  avoid  paying  high tax by
switching  to diesel-engined  vehicles,  or adulterating  fuel  with  a cheaper  substitute.  They  evade
paying  tax by illegally  misclassifying  their  use under  an exempt  category  (such  as agriculture),
or smuggling  fuel  to/from  other  countries.
vii.  Sales  tax, excise  tax, and hnport duty. Motor  vehicles  and motor  vehicle  parts may
be taxed  at point  of sale, at point  of manufacture,  and at point  of import. Most  countries  use
all three stages.  Tax rate, base size, and the extent of preferential  treatment  vary greatly
between countries.  Revenue from these taxes is  rarely earmarked  for  expenditure  on
transportation  services,  but contributes  to general  revenue  and general  economic  policy.
viii.  General  sales  tax  is among  the  most  difficult  to administer.  The  system  is complicated
and the tax rate is often  high. Of the large  number  of potential  taxpayers,  many  fail  to register.
Loopholes,  ambiguities,  and a high tax rate encourage  avoidance. Taxpayers  look for an
opportunity  to shift their  purchase  or production  to an exempt  activity,  or to one subject  to a
lower  tax rate. They  may  submit  exaggerated  refund  claims,  make  unrecorded  cash  sales,  claim
ineligible  credits,  and under-report  sales.
ix.  Import  duty may be the most difficult  to administer. The rate structure  is usually
complex,  rates  are high,  compliance  cost may  be high,  and administration  is often  weak. The
result  is considerable  scope  for undervaluation  and misclassification  (into  lower  rate categories).
Discretionary  exemptions  and a low probability  of detection  aid avoidance. Customs  staff  are
not fidly trained, do not use proper procedures, and often are responsible  for making
clatsification  decisions.  Contact  between  customs  officers  and taxpayers  encourages  corruption
and negotiated  settlements.iii
x.  Excise tax and manufacturer's  sales tax are easier to administer  and have a high
collection  rate. This  is due to fewer  taxpayers,  to less  ambiguity  (excise  tax is due when  goods
are moved),  and to the physical  control  of goods  at the manufacturing  site, making  monitoring
and enforcement  easier.
xi.  Annual  license and  vehicle regtration  charges.  Vehicles are  subject to  a
registration  charge  when  purchased,  and an annual  tax thereafter. Revenue  from  these  charges
varies fromi  insignificant  in most  of the countries  studied  here, to about one-fifth  of transport
sector  revenue  in India. The  annual  license  tax is difficult  to administer.  It reaches  a broad  and
growing  base, but usually  with  a low specific  rate,  The structure  is complex,  record  keeping
is poor, enforcement  is lax, and penalty  is low.  'he compliance  cost is usually  high, often
requiring  documented  proof of compliance  with numerous  other  regulations  before  the license
tax may  be paid.
xii.  Tols.  Toll charges  are easy to administer,  but costly to collect.  Monitoring  is
difficult,  compliance  cost is high, and toll-booth  operators  are easily corrupted.  In most
countries,  tolls are a minor  revenue  source,  usually  related  to a specitic  project. Electronic  toll
collection  systems  could  reduce  some  evasion  and are now relatively  inexpensive  to install.
Reform Options
xiii.  The realiation of greater  revenue  potential  from transport  sector  taxation  requires  a
combination  of administrative  and  policy  changes.  Many  of the present  systems  were  developed
to satisfy  a variety  of macrceconomic  and political  objectives,  only one of which  might  be the
improvement  of road transport  services. A choice  to strengthen  transport  sector  taxation  may
require  a tradeoff  with other objectives.  Two themes  must  underpin  any reform  plans. First,
the tax structure must be set right before the administration  can be redesigned. Second,
governmenits  should  think  in terms  of policies  that reduce  the incentives  to non-compliance  and
policies  that  increase  the expected  cost  of evasion. Part  IV focuses  on four  interrelated  elements
of tax reform.
xiv.  Rate levels. Rate  levels,  particularly  maga  tax rate levels,  should  be kept as low
as possible  to reduce  the incentive  for evasion,  for avoidance,  and for changing  consumption
patterns. However,  high rates  are not a major  cause for the failure  of transport  tax to realize
full revenue  potential. Motor  fuel, the most  important  base, is probably  under-taxed  in most
countries,  and a rate increase  could Likely  be absorbed  with litle,  if any, loss in collection
efficiency. Stricter  etiforcement,  rather  than increased  rates, is the better  approach.
xv.  Uniformity.  Tax reform should  concentrate  on broadening  the tax base, limiting
exemptions,  and moving  toward a single uniform  tax rate.  Rate differentiation  should  be
limited. The  lower  price and the lower  ta  rate on diesel  do not clearly  result  in cost  equity  for
the poorer  consumers  - they  bring  a revenue  loss and subsidize  the largest  beneficiary  of road
expenditure  (industrial  and commercial  trucks).iv
xvi.  Simplcatlon.  Tax reform should  emphasize  simplification  of the tax structure  to
minimize  ambiguity, to ease administration,  to reduce administrative  cost, and to lower
compliance  cost.  A tax structure  with  only a few rates  and classifications  would  increase  the
probability  of detection  for importers  undervaluing  goods, and reduce  the avenues  for goods
reclassification.  Sales  taxation  could  be simplified  by using  the value-added  tax or the retail
sales tax.  Several  suggestions  have  been made  to simplify  the annual  license  tax, but none of
those  tried is sufficient  on its own and several  have  drawbacks.
xvii.  Enforcement and  penalty.  These are the keys to better tax administration.
Taxpayers  will not respond to lower rates and a simpler  rate structure  alone.  Improving
enforcement  requires  improving  four  steps  in the administration  of any tax: collection,  record-
keeping,  assessment  of tax liability,  and identification  of those  liable  to pay the tax.
Transport Taxation  Reform
xviii.  Better admini' Ation  of road user taxes requires  action under all four of the above
headings.  In particular,  transport  fuel  pricing  needs  to be better  coordinated,  and  rate structures
- especially for sales tax, excise tax, and import duty - could be lowered and made more
uniform. In some  countries  there is scope for raising fuel tax and the annual  license tax,
provided  it is accompanied  by better  enforcement.  An incentives  argument  that taxpayers  will
be more  inclined  to pay if they see a direct  benefit  between  tax and expenditure  has not shown
itself in the case studies  for this paper to be viable. The causes  of avoidance,  of evasion,  and
of the failure  to reach  full revenue  potential  are within  tax structures  and administrations.  Here
is where  reforms  must  be made.I.  INTRODUCTION
1.  Road  User  Taxation  (RUT)  is an underutilized  source  of public  financing  in developing
countries. The base of the tax (motor  fuel consumption  and the number  and value  of motor
vehicles)  is growing. The general  view  is that  road  users  can  pay more  tax, that  to charge  them
on the basis of vehicle  size or gasoline  consumption  is fair, that higher  transport  tax reduces
congestion  and pollution,  and that motor  fuel  tax is easily  administered.
2.  Despite  meeting  all of these maxims,  RUT is rarely a mainstay  of tax systems  in
developing  countries.  Some of the reasons  for this include  political  opposition,  fear that
increased transport tax might cripple economic  development,  assessment  and collection
difficulties  with  the non-fuel  components  of RUT,  and problems  with  the  rate and  base  structure.
This paper deals principally  with the latter two constraints,  and about the policy and
administration  options  open to move  RUT toward  full realization  of its revenue  potential.
3.  Three  questions  underlie  this  work. First, do successful  country  practice  and normative
rinciples  tell us there is arght  way tQ  structure  RUT? No.  These  taxes and charges  play
many  different  roles  in national  revenue  systems. In one  country,  the objective  of RUT  may  be
rationing  road use, in another  it may  be financing  construction  and maintenance  of the highway
network,  and in others  it may  be general  revenue  support. To complicate  matters  further,  taxes
on the transport  sector  may  be driven  by macroeconomic  policies,  such  as the need  to conserve
foreign  exchange  or protect  domestic  industry.
4.  Second,  are there generic  rules that lead  to better  administration  of KIW  Yes. A key
rule is that effective  administration  requires  a solid tax structure. On the basis of the case
studies reviewed  here, there are correctable  problems in all areas of  tax administration:
assessment,  collection,  record  keeping,  and identification  of tax bases.
5.  Third, what  is the revenue  potential  of RK?  Though  statistics  are not always  available
(governments  tend to collect  revenue  data  by type  of tax  rather  than  by object),  the  comparisons
in Table  1 suggest  an 11  percent  share  in total  taxes  is not unusual;  a share  in the neighborhood
of 19  percent,  as in India  and Costa  Rica, is possible.  Five countries,  in this sample  of 19, tax
the transport  sector  at a rate greater than 2 percent  of GDP.  Using these  benchmarks,  and
recognizing  that  even  these  higher  numbers  do not take  into  account  evasion  and avoidance,  one
concludes  that many less developed  countries  (LDCs)  have  a substantial  capacity  to expand
RUT.
6.  The next section  examines  the general  setting  for evaluating  tax administration  in the
transport  sector. The topics  covered  include  the nature  oe -he  evasion/avoidance  problem  for
LDC taxes  in general,  the standard  remedies  for non-compliance,  and the directions  in which
tax policy  has turned  in recent  years. Those  interested  in transport  tax system  reform  would  do
well to start  here.  A general  model  of tax evasion/avoidance  is summarized  in Section  m and
presented  in more  detail  in Annex  A.2
7.  The  present  practice  of transport  sector  taxation  is described  in some  detail  in Section  IV,
with reference to eight case studies prepared for this Project.A' These cases show wide
variatiorns  in  compliance,  revenue performance,  administrative  practice, the use of  tax
instruments,  and rate and base structure. The final section  looks  at policy  and administrative
reform.  Has the LDC experience  with tax administration  in general,  and transport  tax in
particular,  taught  us how  best  to structure  and administer  a system  of taxes  and  charges  on motor
vehicles  and roadways?
8.  Some  caveats  should  be mentioned.  This  report  discusses  transport  tax, but is primarily
concerned  with motor vehicles  and road use.  Airports  are mentioned  only in passing,  and
railroads  and seaports  are not discussed. Heavy  reliance  is placed  on the results  from a small
number  of case studies  that  may  or may  not be representative.  Where  possible,  the results  from
other  country  studies  are reviewed,  but these  are neither  comparable  in u.e  sense  of the questions
asked,  nor are they  presented  in the same  level  of detail. Finally,  in some  of the discussion  the
terms tax and charge  are loosely  used.  This is partly a shorthand  convenience  and partly
because  the traditional  distinctions  are blurred  among  several  of the commonly  used  instruments
of transport  taxation. Where  the distinction  is important  it is clearly  made.
I/  Argentina,  Bolivia,  Ghana,  India,  hIdonesia,  Nepal,  Tanzania  and Yugoslavia.3
Table 1:  Motor Fuel and Total Tllsport  Tax
In Nrin  Developing  Coumtries




Tax on Motor  Fuel  Total  Transoort  Tax  ES  I 
Percent  Percent  Per  Perct  Perent  Per
of  of  Capita  of  of  Capita
Country  Year  Total  Tax  GOP  (S  US)  Total  Tax  GOP  (S  US)
1.  Atgeria  1984  0.0  0.7  0.0  1.2  155.2  148.0
2.  Argentina  1987  6.6  1.7  41.0  11.4  3.0  70.9  190.9  158.4
3.  Sol-vla  1988  O.S  3.3  0.6  3.9
4.  Cotombia  1986  2.3  0.2  3.0  6.4  0.7  8.4  89.4  32.1
S.  Costa  Rlca  1986  16.7  3.1  53.9  18.8  3.5  60.8  148.1  131.4
6.  Ethiopia  1985  2.4  0.4  0.5  5.2  0.9  1.0  71.7  32.7
. Chana  1988  1.3  0.2  0.7  A/  0.0  0.0  0.0
1987  4.5  0.6  2.0  4.8  0.6  2.1  34.2  32.3
8.  Guatemala  1988  7.9  0.9  6.8  16.1  1.7  13.8
9.  India  1988  7.9  0.9  0.1  19.0  2.1  0.2
10.  Indoreiaf  1986  4.0  0.6  2.5  7.4  1.2  4.7  62.6
II.  Jamaica  1984  7.5  1.7  0.1  3.0  162.0  98.6
12.  mepal  1985  4.3  0.3  0.5  13.4  1.0  1.4
13.  Pakistan  1985  5.2  0.6  2.0  16.0  1.8  6.2  239.4  78.0
14.  Phitippines  1986  9.1  1.0  5.1  11.6  1.2  6.5
IS.  Sri  Lanka  1985  7.8  1.4  5.5  12.9  2.4  9.1  448.1  270.0
16.  Tanuania  1986  3.4  0.4  0.9  13.1  1.7  3.6
1987  0.6  0.9  1.8  2.5  176.1  64.4
17.  Thatland  1985  9.0  1.3  9.4  13.5  1.9  14.0  198.4  132.6
18.  Tunisia  198S  2.7  0.7  7.6  4.9  1.2  ¶3.7  153.7  85.1
19.  Zaire  1985  7.1  1.2  1.7  7.3  1.2  1.7  57.3  56.2
Medin  6.6  0.6  2.0  11.6  1.7  4.7  155.2  78.0
ean  6.1  0.9  7.4  10.1  1.5  11.3  163.4  98.7
V  P  ROd  fund  only.  The totat  Is  estimated  to  be  three  times  this  amount.4
IH. THE PROBLEM
9.  This report tries to answer the following  questions on the use of transport tax and the
problems  of evasion and avoidance:
*  How urgent is the need to improve tax effort in developing  countries?
*  What is the magnitude  of tax evasion in the transport sector, and are there significant
gains to be had from better enforcement?
*  What policy instruments are currently used for dealing with compliance  and what role
can they play as part of an agenda for improving  enforcement  of transport tax?
*  How can policy makers reconcile the revenue raising and resource allocation objectives
of transport tax?
iWA Problems in LDCs
10.  The 1988 World  Development  Report (World  Bank, p. 182), describes  the poor conduct
of fiscal policy in  developing countries  as  leading to  "...  heavy foreign borrowing, high
inflation, and stagnant private investment". The economic  patterns and fiscal problems facing
low-income countries vary and in each produce a different response, making generalizations
difficult.  However, some fiscal situations  occur repeatedly in many countries.
11.  One is that govemment  expenditure  drives the problems  of budgetary imbalance  in low
income countries.  In  most cases, the ratio of  tax to  GNP is  remarkably stable, but the
expenditure  share may increase  dramatically  over short periods of time. This creates short run
(in some cases long run),  situations of substantial deficit and inflationary financing.  The
following common situations explaining the inability of governments to control spending are
observed in LDCs:
*  Public services are deficient, and pressure to upgrade and fill the most severe
gaps is intense.  In response, governments  often spend for capital improvements
even when their  forecasted tax revenue will not  support the expenditures.
Governments  borrow without the capacity to repay, do not adequately maintain
existing capital stock, and do not operate some facilities to proper standards.
*  Central govemment budgets are  squeezed by public employee compensation
demands,  demands to increase  transfers to local governments,  and the increasing
price  of  non-labor inputs (utilities, asphalt, gasoline, and so on).  Inflation
exacerbates these pressures.5
*  Debt repayment  exerts a fixed and often substantial  claim on available  resources.
*  Govemment budgets are politicized and tend to expand during elections. Often
public employment rolls  are  "padded" as  governments take on  the role of
employer of last resort.
*  Inefficient service delivery adds to the burden.
12.  Some governments are unwilling  to exert a tax effort to close the public services gap.
The Philippines  and Guatemala are countries whose tax burden is inordinately  low by world
standards.  A normal tax effort in either of these countries would all but eliminate the budget
defiJ0t  In other cases the average tax rate, relative to GDP, is not low, but the gap persists.
This could be due to one or both of the following  reasons:  First, the deficit is primarily a
problem of overspending  relative to revenue intake; second, the high (or even normal), average
tax rate translates into a high marginal  rate because only a narrow segment of economic  activity
is taxed.
&oidance and Evasion
13.  Individuals and companies reduce their tax liabilities by a variety of legal and illegal
means.  Avoiding or evading taxes hinders the public sector's revenue generation.  This is
especially  true in developing  countries where tax enforcement  is weak and where the informal
sector of the economy is hard to taxY  The revenue loss from noncompliance  exacerbates a
serious problem resulting from deficient  infrastructure, low taxable  capacity, inadequate  public
services, and substantial  debt repayment  obligations. Developing  countries  often respond  to the
revenue shortfall  by raisitig sales and excise  taxes, increasing  customs  duty, and enforcing  highly
progressive income tax structures.  However, high marginal rates of taxation are thought to
discourage  some  productive  activities, to distort some  economic  decisions,  and to provide furither
incentive for noncompliance.  As a way out of this dilemma, virtually every fiscal reform
program  for  developing and  developed countries recommends base  expansion, removing
exemptions, lowering tax rates, and improving tax administration.
14.  EZ=gmjtins. Under personal income tax, it is not uncommon  for interest income from
bank deposits to be tax free.  Other commonly  exempted items are capital gains and income
f-om fringe benefits.  In most countries the income tax base from companies is eroded by tax
V  The  United States faces much the same situation.
a/  Thorough  statements  of developing  country fiscal  and tax administration  problems  can be found  in Richard  Ooode
(1984), Richard Bird (1983), and G. K. Shaw  (1981).6
incentives  that grant  several  forms  of preferential  treatment  to qualifying  firms  in an attempt  to
increase  economic  development.
15.  The indirect  tax base is also diluted  by exemptions  and preferential  tax treatment. A
variety  of imports  are duty-free,  or are taxed  at preferential  rates. The value-added  tax (VAI)
in most LDCs exempts  a good part of the service  sector,  zero rates many  commodities,  and
either  does  not tax smaller  firms,  or taxes  them  at nominal  rates.
16.  A key problem in designing  tax reform - particularly  income tax reform - is the poorly
understood  relationship  betwoen  tax structure  and tax compliance.  An examination  of the role
that the income tax structure  of developing  counties plays in tax compliance  may provide
lessons  that could  be applied  to the transport  tax structure.
17.  A  formal model, presented in  Annex A,  makes several propositions  about the
deerminants  of tax evasion  and tax avoidance. The rate of evasion  will increase  with  the rate
of tax. A greater  probability  of detection,  a more  severe  penalty  if caught,  and the enforced  loss
of benefits  accrued  by claiming  tax payment,  can  reduce  evasion. Tax avoidance,  on the other
hand, is the legal exploiation  of loopholes  in the system. Loopholes  or exemptions  enable  a
taxpayer  to reduce  liability  by adjusting  the consumption  or the composition  of received  income,
or by making  different  investment  or production  choices.  A policy  to reduce  tax  avoidance  must
include  lower  maginal tax rates,  broader  tax bases  to eliminate  preferential  treatment  of certain
activities, increased transaction  costs to taxpayers  who use legal loopholes,  and stricter
monitoring  of questionable  cases.
18.  The  problems  of  evasion  and  avoidance  must  be approached  simultaneously.  Other  things
being equal,  a reducdon  in the rate of tax evasion  can increase  the rate of tax avoidance,  and
vice versa. For example,  if the  price of evasion  becomes  too high, taxpayers  will seek  other
ways  to reduce  their  burden. Commensurately,,  in the absence  of tighter  enforcement,  closing
loopholes  to reduce  tax avoidance  will increase  tax evasion.
19.  High marginal  tax rates increase  the rewards  for evasion  and avoidance. At lower
marginal  tax rates, individuals  or businesses  are less willing  to risk being  caught  and punished
for tax evasion. Avoidance  at lower  rates may also be less attractive,  since there are costs
involved  in using  exemptions  and deductions.  For example,  time  is needed  for accountants  and
lawyers to prepare the case; there are administrative  costs for changing  the compensation
package  of  employees  toward non-taxable  fringe benefits; there are transaction  costs for
reallocating  an investment  portfolio;  and there  are costs for shiftng production  activities  into
catgories given  preferential  tax treatent.
20.  There  are two qualifiers  to the proposition  that rate reduction  will improve  compliance.
First, the incre  in compliance  may not be large without a  simultaneous  increase in
enforcement.  If an evader  feels  there  is little  probability  of detection,  he may  not be drawn  in,7
regardless of a rate reduction.  An evader might feel that, because of the lower rate,  the
government  will be even more lax in pursuing  evaders. Second,  rate reduction  should not imply
any reduction in the provision of public services.  Rather, the aim is to reduce rates while
increasing the size of the base.  In other words, a  revenue neutral adjustment is  sought.
Otherwise,  rate reduction may be perceived  as a reduction  in the benefits from taxes  paid.  Other
things being equal, such a reduction in benefits would increae  resistance to paying tax.
21.  The probability of detection  may be increased in many ways, most of which are within
the capabilities  of tax administrations  in LDCs.  The identification  of a full tax roll is the most
promising. The registration  of all individuals,  businesses,  and properties subject  to taxation  may
be accomplished  by door-to-door surveys, by using third party information (import licenses,
property transfers, utility  connections,  motor  vehicle  registrations,  and many  other sources),  and
by integrating all tax records. This requires a unique  taxpayer numbering  system, which many
low-income  countries do not have.
22.  Detecting  under-reporting  is as important  as detecting  non-filing. Under-declaration  may
be detected by developing  a presumptive  assessment  system for the hard-to-tax  and for the self-
employed.  A strong audit program is another important protection against under-reporting.
Measures for increasing revenue from customs and excise duty include better inspection
procedures and the  use of an  up-to-date import valuation data system.  Underlying these
proposals should be a  stronger training program, computerization, and better advancement
possibilities for the tax administration  staff.
23.  These detection methods will also reduce tax avoidance  as taxpayers  note the increased
probability  that border line cases will be rejected. The added  cost of preparing an adequate  case
will also discourage avoidance.
24.  An increase in the use of penalties is essential to reducing evasion.  In too many low-
income countries the penalty is  nominal, or rarely applied.  The interest penalty on  the
underpayment  of tax can be below market rates, penalty on under-declaration  of imported  goods
is often minimal, and, though property tax delinquency  may be penalized with the seizure of
property, this rarely occurs.  In some countries court delays create further incentives.  The
problem is compounded  where tax amnesties are common, or where non-compliance  is settled
out of court.
25.  The key to better enforcement  is government  resolve to impose severe  penalties on those
who do not pay.  In most instances laws are adequate  - the problem is with enforcement. One
way to cope with court delays is to make the taxpayer remit the assessed amount pending the
legal decision.  Another approach is to publicly announce  the names of delinquents.8
III.  ROAD TRANSPORT TAXATION
26.  A road  transport  tax has no clear-cut  definition.  If RUT is evaluated  as tax on a sector,
the evaluation  might include whether tax matches  the benefits  from roadway  expenditure;
whether  revenue  collection  is in step  with  growth  in the  potential  transport  tax  base;  whether  the
various  types  of RUT  are having  the desired  allocative  effects;  and whether  the right  RUT "tax
handlesw  are being  used  to make  administration  efficient  and fair. The following  pages  outline
the use of each form of transport  tax and charge. The discussion  focuses  on administrative
procedures,  experiences  with evasion  and avoidance,  RUT revenue  - ld and elasticity,  the
definition  of rate and base, the revent-e  split between  central and local government,  and
problems  with the structure  and adminisLation  of the tax.
Defini  Road T_port  Taxation
27.  In the eight case studies on which this paper is based, the scope of transport tax includes
charges related to the ownership and operation of motor vehicles, and charges related to road
use.  By this general classification,  RUT can be divided into the following  categories:
*  motor fuel tax;
- excise tax, sales tax, and import duty;
*  annual licenses and vehicle registration charges;
D  vehicle tolls and tax on the movement  of goods;
3  income tax on transport-related  activities.
28.  Within these categores,  many types of levies are used.  A road transport study in
Indonesia,  prepared by consultants  in 1982, identified  22 types of RUT in the revenue structure
(Table 2).  Still, ambiguities  persist about what counts as a tax on the transport sector.  For
example, should  income tax on companies  involved  in the production  and sale of motor  vehicles
and transport services be included? Some argue that this is a general tax on income earned by
any business meeting  the exemption  test, and is not specific  to any sector.  A similar study of
India, prepared as background for this report, does not count company income tax on road
transport operators as a road user charge because  it "is not a tax levied on inputs or outputs of
die road transport industry". The Indonesia  study,  by contrast, does count corporate income tax
on importers or domestic assemblers as transport tax.
29.  Some studies view the separation  of general taxes from those related to the use of roads
as necessary.  The Indonesia study separates transport tax into the broad categories  of general
revenue taxes and road user charges.  The former are levied on the transport sector as part of
national revenue policy, while the latter are differentially  higher taxes levied on the transport
sector.  For example, the general rate of customs duty on9
Table 2:  Indon:e  Motor Vehide Tax Sture  (1978)
Specific  User Charge
General  _,.
Revenue  Fxed  Variable
TIIofax  Ta  Admin.  Revenue Admin,  Revenue
A. Motor Vehicies  and Parts
1.  Customs  Duty  x  x
2.  Importers  corporate  tax  x
3.  Import  sales  tax  x  x
4.  Manuftcturing  sales  tax  x  x
5.  Dealers  corporate  tax  x
6.  Ownership  transfer  tax  x
7.  vehicle  tax  x  x
B|. Vehidle  Oprations
1.  Duty  on imported  lubricants  x
2.  Importers  corporate  tax on lubs.  x
3.  Import  sales  tax on lubs.  x
4.  Dealers  corporate  tax  on lubs.  x
S.  Sales  tax on lubricants  x
6.  Sales  tax on spare  parts  x
7.  Sales  tax on tyres  and tubes  x
8.  Drivers  license  fees  x
9.  Tax  on fuel  x
10. Rural  road levies  x
11. Tol road levies  x
C. 
1.  Weigh  bridge  fees  x
2.  Vehicle  inspection  fees  x
3.  Paddng  fees  x
4.  Commercial  route  license  fees  x10
an automobile, or the general rate of value added tax on an automobile  part, comes under the
heading of general revenue tax.  Any differentially higher rate of duty or VAT would be
classified as a specific  road user charge. Specific  road user charges are further subdivided  into
fixed charges, vehicle sales tax, an initial registration fee - or taxes levied periodically, such
as import duty - and taxes that vary with vehicle use, such as fuel tax.
Motor Fuel
30.  Motor fuel tax is the dominant source of revenue from the transport sector.  In the
percentage comparisons between developing  countries, it commonly accounts for half of all
transport tax revenue.  Percentages for the eight countries studied  are:
Argentina (1988)  56 percent
Bolivia (1988)  62 percent
Ghana (1988)  90 percent
Guatemala (1988)  49 percent
India (1988)  47 percent
Nepal (1985)  37 percent
Tanzania (1986)  32 percent
Yugoslavia  (1988)  63 percent
The evidence  presented in Table 1 suggests  that motor fuel tax accounts  for about 6 percent, on
average, of total national tax and is equivalent to around 1 percent of GDP.  The reliance can
be greater.  In Costa Rica, motor fuel tax accounts for more than 16 percent of total national
tax and 3 percent of GDP.
31.  Revenue performance. The potential base of motor fuel taxation is broad enough to
yield significant revenue at  modest rates.  Yet the ceiling for rates depends on political
constraints and the need to avoid placing an undue tax burden on non-road users of petroleum
products.
32.  The revenue  performance  of a tax might also be evaluated  by its income elasticity,  in this
case whether automatic growth in motor fuel revenue is more or less in proportion to GDP.
Most observers believe that revenue from tax on motor fuel is buoyant, that is, it automatically
increases, at least in proportion to GNP.  This assumes that the monetary value of petroleum
consumption  over the long-run will increase faster than GNP.  However, motor fuel tax is not
always income elastic.  For example, income elasticity  of motor fuel tax in Guatemala  between
1984 and 1989 was less than 0.9 percent.  In real per capita terms, motor fuel revenue was 30
percent lower in 1989 than 1986. In Jamaica between 1978 and 1983 (Smith, 1984), there was
a decline in the real value of tax on a gallon of gasoline.  Why is this?  Consider that revenue
income elasticity of motor fuel tax has three components, as described below:11
IdT  =.AI*  dTB * d
dY  dTB  dB  dY
where dT  = percentage change in motor fuel tax revenue;
dY  = percentage change in GDP;
dTB  =  percentage change in the taxable base;
dB  = percentage change in the true market value base;
Buoyancy  from the first component  [ dT |  is derived from the rate structure  of motor fuel
dTBJ
tax.  Under a flat rate ad valorem  tax, rate elasticity  would be unity.  One reason for inelasticity
of motor fuel tax observed in many LDCs, is that a specific (per gallon) tax rate is levied;
hence, periodic discretionary  adjustments  are required for revenue to keep pace with the rising
price of imported petroleum.y  Such adjustments  are politicaUy  difficult, and failure to make
them frequently staUs  the revenue growth of motor vehicle tax.  For example, in Yugoslavia,
failing  to adequately  index the tax rate reduced road user tax revenue by about one-half between
January 1987 and March 1988. This problem has led Yugoslavia,  and also Argentina, to adopt
ad valorem tax rates in recent years.
33.  The second  component  in this simple  formula  is taxable  base elasticity  - that
is, the extent to which the taxable value of motor fu  consumption  proportionately increases
with the market value of motor fuel consumed. This is, potentially,  another source of revenue
inelasticity. In most LDCs, the central government  fixes gasoline prices, detennining the size
of  taxable base elasticity.  Taxable base elasticity is less than unity in  most LDCs if the
government does not let the taxable price increase with the market price.  In Indonesia, for
example, one nationally  owned oil company (Pertamina),  is responsible for all production, but
the price of motor fuel is set by Presidental decree. In practice, the gas tax (subsidy)  is set by
V  If a specific  tx  rate (t  ents pr  allon)  is levied,  then revenue  from a tax  at the  pump will inres  by tdG
wher dG  - chage  in gallons  of consumption
no matter  what  the value  ineas  of the  potential  taxable  base  (ftG)
where  P  is the pump  price.
Since  tdG < dfG)  in most  cas,  the rate  claslicity  will  be less  fn  unity  for  any  given
|T  =  tG
averapetaxmrtre  -g-12
the difference between the administered  retail price of motor fuel and the production cost.  The
same is true in Atgentina, where the government sets the gas tax as the difference  between the
motor fuel retail price and the retention  price for the oil company. The central governments  of
all the countries in this sample, set and regulate the price of fuel.
34.  The third component  of this formula  C  dy]  is base elasticity  of motor fuel tax-  that
is, the ratio of the percent increase in the m  value of motor fuel consumed  to the percent
increase in GNP.  Two factors effect this component  - changes in the market price of motor
fuel, and changes in the amount of fuel consumed. The fall in average  fuel consumption  during
the past 18 years (largely due to fuel economy  measures)  has dampened  b. se elasticity.
35.  Economic justifiation.  Three justifications are commonly  given for the heavy use of
motor fuel tax in less developed  countries.  First is a straightforward  revenue argument. Fuel
consumption is  a  large  tax  base,, is  relatively price  inelastic in  demand, and  is  easily
administered  at the point of importation  or at the refinery. Second is that, since most countries
are oil importers, a high petroleum  tax is supported  on balance of payments grounds.  Third is
efficiency:  Gasoline tax  is  a  rough charge for  the use of  transport services, especially
highways.1Y  The benefits justification contains important weaknesses, which are magnified  in
LDCs.  Despite the rhetoric, in most LDCs the tax on motor fuel is not usually designed as a
benefits levy.
36.  A true benefits levy would approximate  the following  conditions:§'
- Nonpayment  would mean exclusion from the benefits of highway services;
*  Consumers  of highway  services would  pay according to the benefits  they derived;
*  Proceeds of the tax/charge would be spent primarily on highway services;
*  Demand for more or less highway service would be expressed through public
willingness  to consume the service at the price set by the authorities.
37.  In LDCs all of these principles are usually  violated.  First, not all who benefit from the
business use of improved  transport services share the gas tax burden. Nonpaying  beneficiaries
are those whose business profits, property values, and general quality of life are improved  by
I/  In the United  States, total highway expenditure  at all levels of government  is approximately  equal  to total gsoe
tax collection  (Musgrav¢  and  Musgrave,  pp. 230-231).
I/  A thorough  discussion  is in Shoup,  pp. 118-126.13
better access to highway services.  Inequity  from the use of gas tax as a benefits charge occurs
in developing and developed  countries alike.
38.  Second, the gasoline tax does not recognize that different users of highway services
impose different costs on the highway system. Among the variables not usually accounted  for
are  different speeds of  travel, different levels of congestion, different vehicle weights and
different road surfaces.  Third, all gasoline tax revenue is not always designated  for the road
fund.  For  example, in Ghana, only about 20 percent of the  specific levy on gasoline is
earmarked as a charge for highway services.  This implies that the remainder is considered a
general revenue tax and/or a penalty for luxury consumption. Using only part of the gasoline
tax for the road fund suggests in some countries that the tax is levied primarily to conserve'
foreign exchange, or  to  promote macroeconomic or  industrial policy  objectives.2'  The
relationship between total collection from motor fuel tax and total road expenditure  varies
widely, as may be seen from the right column of Table 1.  Of the countries surveyed for this
comparison, the median share is about 80 percent.
39.  Finally, the benefits levy is not set by, nor does it signify, demand for more, less or
different transport services.  If road users want improved or changed services, they must act
through the political process.  If they want lower gasoline prices (the pressure more likely
brought to bear on the political  process), they may threaten to strike, boycott, or even publicly
protest.  Despite low levels of automobile  ownership  and gasoline tax, the public in developing
countries is sensitive  to sharp increases  in gasoline  prices.  The principal users of the transport
system - automobile  owners and taxi drivers, mini-van owners, and their customers - are
usually educated and often politically  vocal and influential  (see also Due, 1988, Chapter 4).
40.  The motor fuel tax must serve several functions; policy makers see it as a way to
improve resource allocation,  to redress an unequal distribution  of income, and to raise revenue.
in most countries fuel tax gives preferential treatment for some activities and penalizes  others.
Ease of administration  encourages  reliance on motor fuel tax, but preferential treatment  and the
political problems inherent in raising gasoline tax imposes constraints  on its use.
41.  Rate  nd base.  Motor fuel is taxed in several ways.  Imported petroleum  is subject to
a customs  duty; domestic  refineries  are subject  to an excise tax; the state monopoly  on petroleum
products may be taxed retained earnings; a retail sales tax may be imposed on the pump price;
and the pump price may be set above (below), production cost.
V/  Not a*1  industrial  countries  cannark the gasoline  tax for the tmnsporatation  service. Tait and Morgan (1980)  note
that of 10 (Organization  for Economic  Cooperation  and Development  (OECD)  countries  studied, only six devoted
all or part of their excise on petroleum  to financing  highways.14
42.  Some countries  use only one of these tax forms and others use a combination. For
example,  Bolivia  taxes  domestic  production  and use of motor  fuel  through  a production  tax, a
value-added  tax, a transaction  tax, a royalty,  and the transfer  to the government  of a share  of
state  oil monopoly  profits. Indonesian  law provides  for  a 10  percent  excise  tax and a 10  percent
sales tax on motor fuel consumed,  but in practice  neither  is levied. Instead,  the Indonesian
government  sets the tax (subsidy)  rate as the differential  between  production  cost and retail
pAce.
43.  In most  countries,  the tax  rate on motor  fuel  is specific  rather  than  ad valorem. As noted
above, the problem  with  a specific  rate is that it must  be indexed  to the base  price to maintain
revenue  elasticity.  If this  is not  done,  the government  must  make  periodic,  unpopular,  tax hikes.
For countries  deriving  gasoline  revenue  from a tax rather than from the profits  of the state
monopoly,  the solution  to the elasticity  problem  has  been  an ad valorem  rate. Assessment  under
a value-based  tax need not be more complicated. Petroleum  prices are fixed, and physical
methods  of control  may  be used, but revenue  growth  becomes  automatic.
44.  Though  a specific  rate is still  widely  used,  there  is  a trend  toward  establishing  ad valorem
rate structures. Of the eight  countries  covered  here, the adoption  of ad valorem  in Yugoslavia
and Argentina  has been  mentioned;  Nepal  has established  a percent  rate sales  tax on motor  fuel
(but  not import  duty);  and Indonesia  has an ad valorem  rate in theory, if not practice.
45.  Some  argue  that with  an ad valorem  rate structure,  revenue  faUs  when  petroleum  prices
fall, and inflation  is stimulated  when  petroleum  prices  rise.  The stability  argument  has been
proven.  However,  there is less evidence  that fuel tax increases  drive up general  consumer
prices. Hughes  (1987),  has compared  the price effects  of revenue  neutral  increases  in fuel  tax
and a general  consumption  tax in Tunisia,  Indonesia,  and  Thailand. His  results  are partly  based
on input-output  tables  for those  countries,  taking  into account  direct  and indirect  effects. The
results  show  that a general  consumption  tax leads  to a larger  price rise than does  an equal  tax
yield on gasoline. Thus, factor  income  rather  than consumption  carries  a majority  of the fuel
tax increase  burden. Repeating  the experiment  using  the various  fuel taxes, Hughes  finds  that
only kerosene  yields  a significant  price effect.
46.  Rate structures  in LDCs  tend  to be differentiated  according  to type  of fuelY The usual
practice  ignores  road use efficiency  maintaining  a higher  petrol  tax rate than  the rate on diesel
fuel  (and  fuel used  for non-road  purposes).  Diesel-powered  vehicles  tend to be heavier,  impose
a greater  road maintenance  cost, and travel  greater  distances  per gallon  of gasline consumed.
This suggests  that diesel consumers  should  carry the greater tax burden.  Either way, the
introduction  of a differential  rate structure  immediately  complicates  tax administration. At
ftI  This is differat fiom the practice in most indusrlized  countries,  which  tax  both  at the same  nrt.  Singapore,
however, has not taxed  die  fuel  sicer 1979.15
present, it encourages  users to sw,tch to diesel-driven  vehicles, and opens the door for
unintended  preferential  treatment.
47.  In the face of these problems,  why do governments  differentiate  between  fuel rates?
Three  reasons  are often  cited. First  concerns  income  distribution  - lower  diesel  rates  subsidize
public  transportation,  which  is mainly  used  by the poor, and higher  gasoline  tax rates  are borne
disproportionately  by higher  income  people  who are most  likely  to own and operate  vehicles.
Second,  the present  system  leaves  private  transportation  underpriced.  The short run marginal
costs imposed  by motor vehicles on roadways  are not covered  by existing  user charges.
Therefore,  a reduction  in the price of public transportation  through  lower diesel  cost  aims to
keep the relative  fuel  prices  socially  balanced.
48.  The third  reason  governments  differentiate  is to give favored  treatment  to non-transport
diesel  (including  home  heating  fuel)  use. The aim is to protect  low  income  families  and avoid
compromising  industrial  development.  The counter-argument  is that a blanket  subsidy  to diesel
fuel is a subsidy  to road haulers  and shippers,  and to beneficiaries  of these  services. Different
fuel prices also distort  transportation  choices  against  altematives  such as rail, and they may
distort  location  choices  for production  facilities  by lowering  transportation  costs.  Finding  an
equitable  rate structure  is difficult. For example,  instituting  the correct  policy  of lower  rates
for off-highway  diesel use (farming,  industry,  railroads,  electricity  generation,  and so on),
creates  complex  administrative  problems  (Due 1988,  pp. 78-79).
49.  Exemptions  are another  departure  from  the  broad  base,  flat  rate maxim  that characterizes
efficient  taxation. No pattern  or general rule appears  for motor  fuel tax exemptions. For
example, Yugoslavia  exempts  use by the army, by the marines, and use for agricultural
purposes;  Nepal  exempts  only  diplomatic  use;  and Ghana  provides  no exemptions.  For the case
study  countries,  no data  are available  on how much  the tax  base  is compromised  by exemptions.
50.  Inmental  sharing.  For many sound  reasons, motor fuel tax is levied by
central  government  in most  developing  countries.  Gas  prices  are politically  sensitive  and motor
fuel taxation  is too big a national  revenue  source  to tum over to local government  control.
Allowing  local  govemment  to affect  prices,  even  at the margin,  can  be dangerous.  If inter-local
variations  in gas prices  were large  enough,  fuel carrying  would  result.
51.  This said, in some countries  local government  does benefit  from motor  fuel tax.  In
Argentina,  Guatemala,  Indonesia,  and India,  a portion  of receipts  is distributed  to the state  and
local government  sectors.  Allocation  and distribution  formulas  vary among countries. In
Argentina,  an excess  profit  on motor  fuel is defined  as one-half  the  difference  between  retention
price and government-defined  market price.  The former is roughly a breakeven  figure.
Approximately  9 percent  of the excess  profit  is distributed  to the  provinces  as their  share  of the
fuel fund. Guatemalan  municipalities  share  2 cents  per gallon  of the gasoline  tax.16
52.  Some local/provincial governments  are given power to tax motor fuel and retain the
revenue.  In Indonesia, provincial government  is, in theory, allowed to levy fuel tax, but this
power is not used.  Bahl and Linn (forthcoming)  surveyed the local government use of motor
fuel tax in  the  1970s and  1980s.  They found fuel tax was levied by  a  few large urban
governments  in LDCs.
53.  A  . A major attraction of motor fuel taxation is ease of administration.
Since there are relatively few distribution points, and few distributors, the liable taxpayer is
easily identified and policed.  In Indonesia, for example, the nationally owned oil company
(Pertamina), assesses and collects all domestic tax on motor fuel.  The situation is similar in
Nepal.  Tax on motor fuel in Ghana is paid by a small number of distributors. The tax is based
on  their  supply from the National Petroleum Company, which is  the  sole importer.  In
Yugoslavia, the tax is administered by a few petrol companies, that own and operate petrol
'tations. Input and output prices remain centrally  determined. Fuel price is centrally  regulated
in Indch, where the government collects the tax at its source as part of import or ex-factory
prices.  Siace input and output prices are usually  fixed, collection  cost is borne by distributors
or factories.  As the compliance  controls are straightforward,  collection cost is not high.  Due
(1988, p.  79), notes that inspectors  at refineries are not necessary.  In Bolivia, collection cost
is estimated to be less than 1 percent of collected fuel tax revenue.
54.  Evasion. avoidance  and revenue potential.  Problems with evasion or avoidance of
motor fuel tax in the eight sample countries are rare - all report a collection rate of 100
percent. 2'  But a 100 percent collection rate means only that the total billed amount is collected.
This implies that as far as tax collection is concerned,  evasion is not a problem.  Neither is
assessment a  problem, since taxpayers and petroleum suppliers are  easily identified, and
assessment  methods are straightforward.
55.  The bigger issues in transport tax administration  are whether the fuel tax base is assessed
fully and whether legal tax avoidance  occurs. The evasion  of motor fuel tax through smuggling
is discussed later.
56.  The first gap between revenue potential and revenue collection lies within the legal
definition  of the tax base, that is, the level at which market  price is defined. Among LDCs, any
commonality  of practice in fuel pricing is the placement of diesel and kerosene below border
prices and the placement of gasoline at a higher level.  One recent World Bank study in
Tanzania estimates that, on average, diesel and kerosene are set at 25 to 40 percent below
international  border prices, and that gasoline,  on average, is set at 50 percent above. The ideal
2/  An inteeting  exception  is Chad where  the government  failed  to pay for its deliveries  and the oil companies
responded  by withholding  their tax payments.  417
is a motor fuel tax with a large enough yield to cover state monopoly  losses and contribute to
the general budget or to transportation  network financing.
57.  When the net-of-tax economic  price for fuel is above the net-of-tax administered  price,
the financial tax levied may be partially or fully offset by subsidy.  The result may be a net
transport sector subsidy, rather than a road use tax.  In Indonesia, a 9 percent subsidy  to petrol
and a 67 percent subsidy to diesel were only partially offset by gas tax and led to real revenue
loss from motor fuel taxation. In Ghana too, all categories  of fuel appear to be subsidized. This
results in motor fuel taxation far below its economic  potential in most LDCs.  This taxation
dilemma  is part of what led governments  to subsidize  gasoline prices.0
58.  Tax avoidance  is the other cause for fuel tax falling short of revenue potential. The tax
structure allows users to reduce motor fuel tax liability by altering business practices; for
example, claiming exemption, or using cheaper fuel or different transportation modes.  Fuel
carrying is another example. By driving  to a rural area, motor fuel may be purchased cheaper.
There is no evidence of rural-urban fuel carrying in the cases examined  here.  Bahl and Linn
(forthcoming),  argue that the high cost and low return on fuel carrying make differentially  higher
urban fuel prices quite feasible.  Other ways of avoiding  paying higher motor fuel tax such as
purchasing small vehicles, and making greater use of public transportation,  are thought  to be in
the government's interest.
59.  Some  features of the motor fuel tax in LDCs provide  incentive  for evasion. Complicated
administration  increases evaders' probability of success.  For example, exemption for certain
classes of fuel users encourages reclassifying  activities to exempt categories.  In Yugoslavia,
anry,  marine, agricultural, and pizblic  bus operators  are partally,  totally, or fully exempt from
fuel tax.  By comparison with fully taxed use of fuel, marine use is 47 percent cheaper,
agricultural use is 40 percent cheaper, and bus use is 39 percent cheaper.  The incentive  for
illegally classifying other private sector activities as exempt, or engaging in  some form of
transfer pricing, is strong.  However, in Yugoslavia,  it is argued that little or no evasion  occurs
because the penalties are said to be severe enough to be an effective  deterrent.
60.  Differential  prices for diesel, kerosene,  premium  and regular gasoline,  open another door
for evasion.  The differentials  are often large, inciting  petroleum adulteration. One approach
for dealing with this problem, taken by the government  of Ghana, imposes  a differentially  higher
excise on regular gasoline to equalize  wholesale  prices.  Other, more administrative  approaches
are  coloring types of fuel for easier identification, using additives to discourage improper
blending, or restricting the quantity  sold at any one time.
IQ/  Low fuel prices also give rise to other problems. For example,  in Tanzania  the combination  of a low fuel  price
and a low margin to cover transport  cost discourages  the hauling  of fuel  to inland  locations.18
61.  Smuggling  due to fuel  price  differentials  between  countries  is another  problem.  The  price
of gasoline  in Tanzania  is well  below  that of neighboring  Kenya. Fuel  is smuggled  between  the
two.  The  problem  in Tanzania  was complicated  in 1987  by an overvalued  exchange  rate.  As
one World  Bank  study  noted,  "...fuel is imported  into Tanzania,  jaid for in foreign  currency,
and then resold  over the border  for local currency." The  cost to the Tanzanian  government  is
a revenue  loss, assuming  that motor  fuel is set below  market  price. Fuel prices  in Ghana  are
also relatively  low.  This leads  to fuel carrying  from Ghana  to neighboring  Ivory Coast. It is
estimated  that such  leakage  is around 1 percent  of total  domestic  sales  with  a concentration  on
kerosene.  Thus, rather  than undercollecting  the  Govemnment  of  Ghana is  modestly
overcollecting.  However,  with  Ghana's  ex-refinery  prices  well  below  world  prices,  it is doubtful
if the tax revenue  collected  on illegally  exported  fuels compensates  for the subsidy  lost.
Purchase  Taxation: Duty  and Sales  Tax
62.  Tax on the sale  and purchase  of motor  vehicles  and parts  are collected  in four different
forms:  import  duty, general sales tax, excise on domestic  production,  and income  tax on
manufacturers  and dealers. Though  the motor  vehicle  share  of these  tax bases  is significant,  it
may not be meeting  full revenue  potential.  To determine  the extent of revenue  potential
reached,  the tax base  definitions  and rate structures  in various  countries  must  be reviewed  and
matched  against  modem  norms  for a good tax.  An evaluation  of administrative  practice,  and
an exploration  of divisions  of responsibility  for these taxes among central and subnational
governments  is also required. Lastly,  we take  up the reduction  of avoidance  and evasion.
63.  Revenue  importance.  The  revenue  importance  of sales  and production  taxes,  as a share
of GNP and as a share  of total transport  tax, is described  for a small  sample  of countries  in
Table  3.  Based  on this small  sample,  one-third  of all revenue  collected  from transportation
activity  seems  a feasible  level.
Table  3: Revenue  from  Customs  Duty,  Sales  Taxes  and Excises
on Motor Vehicles  and Motor Vehicle  Parts
Percent  Percent of Total
Country  Year  of GDP  Transport Taxes
1. Argentina  1987  0.7  22.4
2.  Nepal  1985  0.3  33.7
3. Tanzania  1986  1.1  64.6
4.  India  1988  0.4  19.2
5.  Guatemala  1988  0.6  32.2
6.  Indonesia  1980  0.4  n.a.
7. Jamaica  1984  1.0  33.0
64.  Revenue  from these taxes  is rarely earmarked  for expenditure  on transportation  services.
The evaluation  of practices  in this area centers  on the contribution  of these transport  taxes to
general  revenue,  and to increasing  their contribution  through  improved  administration.19
Ba_e  d rate struCau.  There  are three points  at which  the value  of motor  vehicles
and motor vehicle  parts can be taxed: at point of sale, at point of import, and at point of
manufacture.  Nearly all countries  make  use of all three stages. Beyond  this, however,  it is
difficult  to describe  a common  pattern  for taxing  the  purchase  and  production  of motor  vehicles
and parts.  Every country  develops  an approach  consistent  with its economic  goals, with its
existing  tax structure,  with  its foreign  exchange  position,  with  the skills  of its tax administration,
and with the degree  to which  it is trying  to protect  domestic  manufacture  or assembly  of motor
vehicles. The degree  of rate and base  variations  is evident  from  a summary  review  of practices
followed  in several  of the case study  countries. Indonesia  takes  the broadest  approach,  levying
the following  taxes  on the purchase  and production  of motor  vehicles:
*  customs  duty;
*  income  tax on importers;
*  sales  tax on imports;
*  manufacturer's  sales  tax;
*  income  tax on dealers;
*  owner-hip  transfer  tax.
Indonesia  also may tax the narrowest  base  in that many  motor  vehicle  purchases  are subject  to
preferential  treatment.  Most importandy,  all commercial  vehicles (all pickups) and all
govemment  purchases  are exempt  from sales  tax and from customs  duty.  Parts imported  for
assembly  (completely  knocked down units) also are exempt  from customs  duty.  The rate
suctures  for customs  duty and for sales tax are complicated,  but generally  favorable  to the
tansport  sector. Completely  knocked  down  units  are given  a preferential  sales tax rate.  The
highest  rate is levied  on completely  built-up  units  - twice  the rate on unassembled  units.
65.  India  uses  a combination  of excise  duty,  sales  tax, and  customs  duty  to tax the  production
and purchase  of motor vehicles  and motor vehicle  parts.  The Indian system  is the most
complicated  of those  considered. The  entral  government  levies  customs  duty  on all imported
vehicles  and parts, and levies  excise  duty  on the domestic  manufacture  of motor  vehicles  and
parts. A credit  is allowed  vehicle  manufacturers  for certain  taxes  paid on inputs  - excise  duty,
special  excise  duty, and additional  customs  duty. There  are several  restrictions  on the use of
this credit. For example,  credit  is valid  for a manufacturing  site  rather  than for a firm, and the
inputs  must  be included  in an identifiable  output  unit. This  involves  complicated  recordkeeping
and classification.  The rates  of customs  duty and  excise  duty  vary  according  to the component
being  imported  or produced,  with the highest  rate for imported,  assembled  vehicles.
66.  Sales  tax in India  is levied  at the wholesale  and/or  retail  level  by state  governments  and
central  government.  State  governments  may set  their  own sales  tax rate, restricted  only in that
(1) the tax rate may not exceed  4 percent  on interstate  transactions,  and (2) the tax may not
discdminate  against  goods  produced  outside  the state. Commodities  are the tax base and most20
services (including  transport), are exempt. Central sales tax is levied  on interstate  trade at a rate
of 4 percent, or at the level applied in the state where the sale takes place, whichever rate is
lowest.
67.  Three taxes are levied on vehicles and parts purchases in Tanzania.  In theory, import
duty is payable  on all motor vehicles,  but discretionary  relief is granted. The result is that about
half the tax due on imports is collected. The rate structure  varies, depending  on the import, but
the duty is 100 percent for vehicles  with large engines. Sales tax, collected  at the import stage,
has the same rate as customs duty, except for the tax on spare parts, which is twice the customs
duty rate.  Sales tax on vehicle transfers is based on a schedule, with rate graduated according
to vehicle age, weight, and engine size.
68.  Nepal derives about one-third  of its tax on the transport sector from motor vehicles  and
parts.  Three levies are involved: sales tax, import  duty, and import license tax.  Customs  duty
is levied on vehicles, spare parts, and tires at a high rate relative to the other sample  countries
- except for imports from India, which are taxed at a lower rate.  Also, for qualified  imports,
Indian excise  duty legally  may be refunded. Import  license fees are sold at three rates: 5 percent
of cost, insurance, and freight (c.i.f.) value (trucks  and buses), 10 percent of c.i.f. value (eeps
and motorcycles),  and 25 percent of c.i.f. value (automobiles). Vehicles  and parts purchased
by government or by privileged educational and social organizations  are exempt from duty,
license fee, and sales tax.  Sales tax base is the sum of c.i.f. value, customs  duty, and a markup
on c.i.f. plus customs. For most vehicles  the markup is 100  percent, for Indian imports it is 15
percent, and for government  and government  corporations, there is no markup.  Sales tax rate
varies from 20 percent on cars to 15  percent on trucks and buses, and to 10 percent on tires and
spare parts.
69.  In Ghana, taxation on motor vehicle purchases is light, and in recent years import duty
has been reduced or  abolished.  There is no duty on trucks, buses, small-engine cars, or
commercial vehicles.  Large-engine cars are  subject to  a  15 percent or  25  percent rate,
depending  on engine size.  Spare parts are subject  to a 10 percent rate.  All vehicles more than
five years old are subject to import duty at ascending rates reaching 100 percent for vehicles
more than 10 years old.  Import duty rates on vehicles are in line with those levied on other
imported commodities. Vehicles  or parts subject to import duty are also subject to a sales tax
of 10 percent of c.i.f. value (or selling price, if domestically  produced).
70.  In Yugos!avia,  the main objective  of import  duty is to protect domestic  industry. Import
duty rates range between 25 percent for automobiles  and 20 percent for buses, trucks, parts, and
tires.  An equalization  tax of 10 percent and a special tax of 4.8 percent are additionally  applied
to  duty-paid value.  Sales tax  is  levied at  the retail level,  except for  direct sales from
manufacturers,  with whom liability for collection resides.  Sales to commercial  enterprises are21
exempt.  There are separate sales tax levies at federal, state, and local levels.  The federal rate
is 15 percent on vehicles and 17 percent on spare parts.  The state rate varies widely.
71.  In ArgenDtina,  six taxes are levied on the production or purchase of new vehicles.  The
rates are high relative to the other sample countries.  The structure of customs duty is driven
more by import control than by revenue-raising. The import duty rate ranges from 20 percent
to 55 percent for most products, with motor vehicles at the top of this range.  In addition  to
customs  duty, all imports  pay a statistical  charge (3 percent of customs  valuation),  and an export
promotion tax (0.5 percent of customs  valuation).  The Argentinean  value-added  tax is levied
at a basic rate of 15 percent. In addition,  there are special taxes on the purchase and production
of new cars.  The excise tax rate varies with fuel consumption,  but between 4 and 8 percent of
list price.  The highest rate on domestically  produced automobiles  is 12 percent.  All imports
must pay a rate of 21 percent of list price.  The National Highway Fund also earmarks a tax
equivalent to 7  percent of  purchase price.  Tires are  subject to  three sales taxes, with a
consolidated  rate of 27 percent of retail price.  There is no central tax on used car sales.
72.  About 20 percent of Bolivia's import duty in 1987  was attributable  to motor vehicles  and
spare parts.  In recent years, the number and type of imported vehicles  and the effectiveness  of
customs  administration  varied widely. Hence, revenue yield has been volatile. Value-added  tax
is charged on all new car sales, and accounts for about 5 percent of total VAT collection. A
uniform VAT rate of 10 percent applies to all sales through  the retail level (for covered firms).
A transaction  tax of 1 percent of the value of every commercial  transaction  also is levied on new
car sales and transfers.  Finally, before a new vehicle may be registered, municipalities  charge
a fee equivalent  to 5 percent of assessed import value.
73.  Itor  etals  _g. For most countries,  vehicle purchase  and production  taxes
are levied by central government.  Except in large federations, import and excise duties and
general sales tax are usually reserved for the central government. Still, local governments  do
benefit from special levies, from the property transfer tax, from shares of central taxes, and
from vehicle purchase and production taxes.
74.  The Indian federation is a case where state and local government  are heavily involved
in vehicle  purchase taxation. Approximately  25 percent of total purchase  tax is collected  directly
by state govemnment  in the form of sales tax.  As noted above, states may set general sales tax
rates (which also apply to motor vehicles), subject only to the constraints that they do not
discriminate  against interstate trade, and do not exceed the 4 percent federal rate on interstate
transactions. Liability for tax payment  is with the seller; hence states must register all dealers,
oversee necessary  recordkeeping,  and be responsible  for assessment  and collection.22
75.  Yugoslavia  gives its provincial  and local governments  considerable  revenue-raising
latitude. There  are sepamte  sales  tax rates for central,  state  and local  government,  with some
state  rates higher  than those  levied  at the center.
76.  Bolivian  municipalities  impose  a fee equivalent  to 5 percent  of assessed  import  value  for
registration  of any new  car.  They  also  receive  a 10  percent  share  of the national  government's
1  percent  transaction  tax.:  Loal government  in Argentina  gave  up its claim  on independent  local
taxdng  powers  in exchange  for a share  in central  revenue. However,  muricipalities  may still
levy a transfer  tax on the sale  of used  cars.  Provincial  government  in Indonesia  also levies  a
tax on the transfer  of motor  vehicle  ownership.  The transfer  of ownership  yielded  less than 3
percent  of total  provincial  government  revenue  in 1982. Since  the tax rate is high -5  percent
on ordinary  vehicles  and 10  percent  on luxury  vehicles  - this is surprising.  New  car purchases
are included  in the base.
77.  The local govemnn  ents  of Tanzania  and Ghana  play a minimal  role in transport  sector
taxation.  Local  government  participation  in most  developing  countries  consists  largely  of annual
licenses,  registration,  and toll charges.
78.  Eujgoyn  avoda=  and revenue  poteial.  Vehicle  purchase  tax is less  easily  collected
and enforced  than is tax on motor fuel.  This situation  is caused by a greater number  of
coletion  points, a greater need for active  enforcement  of the tax, and a greater need for
discretion  in establishing  the taxable  base. Unfortunately,  no detailed  data  exist  for a study  of
each  country's  ability  to collect  potential  revenue  from vehicle  purchase  tax. The case  studies
do make  it possible  to understand  why tax evasion  and tax avoidance  occur, and clarify  which
steps  will bring  revenue  from  purchase  tax closer  to its potential.
79.  Avoidance  of vehicle  purchase  tax  occurs  for two reasons. First, a high  enough  tax rate
gives  the seller/purchaser  an incentive  to escape  a portion  of the tax; the savings  are worth  the
cost  of  the  adjustment.  A  dangerously  prohibitively  tax  rate  (cowmbined  with weak
administration),  is reported for Tanzania. High import duty and sales tax rates on motor
vehicles  encourage  more  applications  for discretionary  exemption  or preferential  treatment,  and
incrsed  evasion. The result,  described  in Figure  1, is that the amount  of duty  collected  falls
as the duty rate increases. Though  no other factors are taken  into account,  the results  are
striling.  For example,  when  duty payable  is 20 percent,  duty collected  averages  about 40
percent  of payable. When  duty payable  is raised  to 80 percent,  duty collected  fails to only 13
percent. Thus, a lower tax rate could  actually  increase  revenue  collection.
80.  The second reason for avoidance  is a tax structure complicated  with loopholes  or
ambiguities. Taxpayers  look for an opportmity  to shift their purchase  or production  to an
exempt  activity  or to one subject  to a lower  tax rate.  Import  duty  on motor  vehicles  in Ghana23
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is a case in point. All cars with  a capacity  less than 1600  cubic  centimeters  (if petrol  driven),
and less than 1800  cubic  centimeters  (if diesel  driven),  are exempt. Because  the duty rate on
non-exempt  vehicles  is high, importers  frequently  mis-declare  cubic  capacity. Another  point
where flaws  in the tax structure  open the door for tax avoidance  and evasion  is the state  sales
tax in India. The tax rate is high  and the system  is complicated.  Two examples  illustrate  the
problem:
*  State sales tax rates are generally  higher  than the central  sales tax rate.  In an
interstate  sale, the seller  is subject  to the central  rate  only. When  the same  trader
or manufacturer  transfers  goods  to another  site, there  is no tax, even  if the other
site is in a different  state.  Buyers and sellers take full advantage  of this,
frequently  arranging  purchases  from  out-of-state  vendors  and  vertically  integrating
activities.
- To eliminate  double  taxation,  the government  provides  credit for tax paid on
certain  inputs  against  tax paid  on total  output. However,  determining  which  taxes
may be credited  is complicated  and involves  an extensive  recordkeeping  system.
Further,  the system  contains  ambiguities.  For example,  some  duties  are variable
depending  on the final  use of the input  in production;  hence,  the amount  of credit
is uncertain. Out of such  complications  come  various  forms  of transfer  pricing
to reduce  overall  tax liability.
81.  The chief  avenue  for avoidance  is exemption. It is estimated  that the collection  rateW
on import duty in Tanzania  is only  about  45 percent  - not accounting  for evasion. About  one-
third  of this shortfall  is due to discretionary  exemption. In Indonesia,  where there are many
exemptions  for various  types  of motor  vehicles,  only about  75 percent  of  potential  tax revenue
is collected.
82.  The determinants  for tax evasion overlap with those for  tax avoidance.  Unlike
avoidance,  however,  evasion  is the illegal  result  of taxpayers  failing  to file, underdeclaring  tax
liability,  or failing  to remit  taxes  that are due. Several  characteristics  make  a tax regime  prone
to a high rate of evasion:
*  A high tax rate (and  perhaps  high  compliance  cost);
*  A poor or corrupt  administration,  where detection  is unlikely;
*  A complicated  tax structure  and ambiguous  tax legislation;
*  A low penalty  rate for non-compliance;
*  A government  unwilling  to enforce  the tax and stringently  apply  the penalties;
wI  Mem  oolon  rate  is defined  as the ratio  of collction  to the full  value  of impoited  motor  vehicles.25
A history  of frequent  amnesties.
This list describes  the tax system  of many  developing  countries,  and the dynamics  of vehicle
purchase  taxation  in some  of the case studies.
83.  Customs  administration  problems  can be traced to four root causes, all of which
contribute  to the failure  to realize  full revenue  potential  from import  duty on motor  vehicles.
First is misclassification  to evade  import  duty.  Under  complicated  tariff structures,  customs
officers  are responsible  for making  classification  decisions.  This system  may result  in different
rates of duty. The taxpayer's  incentive  to mis-report  contents,  and the difficulty  in detecting
misreporting  increase  with the degree  of rate differentiation.
84.  Second,  staff  are not fully  trained,  do not use  proper  procedures,  and often  undervalue
imports.  This form of evasion  is highly  successful,  since  customs  inspectors  in developing
countries  must  rely  on invoice  reviews  and available  information  on current  market  values. The
lack of officer  training  in import  valuation  and the lack of up-to-date  valuation  information
means  undervaluation  is likely  to remain  an important  source  of import  duty  evasion. Adequate
staff and proper  procedures  could  better  police  another  form of evasion: the importation  of a
vehicle  on a temporary  basis, with intent  to keep  it in the country  indefinitely. This form of
evasion  is most easily  accomplished  where  there  are entry  points by land.
85.  Third, customs  administration  is often corrupt.1  Smuggling  may offer a return of
more than 100 percent, especially  with little probability  of detection. The probability  of
detection  can be lowered  with the collaboration  of customs  officials  - they may be easily
enlisted  if their salaries  are low.  Smuggling  is also  aided  by the often lax physical  control  of
goods  through  customs.
86.  Collection  rate on excise  from domestically  produced  automobiles  is high due in part to
the physical  control of goods at the manufacturing  site.  The evasion  of sales tax is more
problematic.  Since  a substantial  portion  of sales  tax is collected  at the import  level,  evasion  of
import  duty  is compounded  with  like evasion  of sales  tax. There  are many  ways  that domestic
traders  (especially  in parts and tires), might  evade  general  sales tax.  Tait (1988,  chapter 14),
lists the more common  approaches  as:  failure  to register,  underreported  sales, exaggerated
refund  claims,  unrecorded  cash  purchases,  and claim;nig  ineligible  credits.
IV  Due,  1988,  p. 51, aW probknu  of customs  cormption.  "Customs  work  is more  vulnemabl  to  briey  hn most
other  typc of tax  collection.  IThe a  frequent  chanco for  differences  of opinion,  and  there  is close  contao
between  the importer  (or hi  broker)  and customs  pronnd.  The  importer  cannot  obtain  hi  goods  until  the
assesed  duty  is paid;  the officer  is therfore in a position  to seek  a bribe,  and  the importer  may  rerd  the bribe
as  cheaper  than  higher  duties  and  penalies  and  eadless  delay..."26
87.  The state sales tax in India preents an especially  difficult  problem, because  proper
enforcement  requires  interstate  cooperation.  Some  firms  falsely  declare  their  sales  as interstate
to avoid  state  sales  tax - an easy  evasion  technique,  since  officials  have  no physical  proof  that
goods did not pass out of the state.  An attempt  at control  requires the importer  to hold a
license,  issued  by his home  state, if makdng  an interstate  purchase. However,  verification  of a
licensed  importer  requires  the cooperation  of the importing  state, which  stands  neither  to gain
nor to lose revenue  since liability  is with the seller. The result is rampant  evasion. A 1981
evaluation  of the Bihar sales  tax system  by the National  Institute  of Public  Finance  and Policy
found  that  in most  years  revenue  collection  fom motor  parts was  less than  half of the estimated
tax potential  (as reported  by Acharya,  1985). A more  recent  study  of the sales tax collection
rate in all of India  shows  a lower  rate of revenue  realization  for state  govenment tax than for
central  government  tax (Government  of India, 1989,  Chapter  IV). The  tax recovery  rates  from
this study, shown  below, define leakages  from full taxation  as the sum of exemptions  and
evasion:
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88.  Vehicle  purchase  tax in Argentina  is redatively  simple  and claims  a low rate of evasion.
The main  leakage  on the new  vehicle  tax is in the area  of concessionary  sales  by manufacturers.
Otherwise,  the tax  is collected  with  relative  ease  from  a small  number  of manufacturers/dealers.
There  is some  evasion  in the sale  of spare  parts  because  more  establishments  are involved.  The
total revenue  loss due to evasion  of the purchase  tax on motor  vehicles  and parts is estimated
at about 10  percent  of tax collection.27
he Annual License  and Motor Vehiele  Reisration  Charei
89.  In most  countries,  motor  vehicles  must  be registered  when  first  purchased,  and they are
subject  to an annual  tax.W The latter usually  takes the form of a license,  though  in Bolivia
(among the countries in this sample), a property tax is levied on the assessed  value of
automobiles.l' Revenue  from registration  and from the annual  tax on motor  vehicles  varies
from  insignificant  in most  of the countries  studied,  to about  one-fifth  of transport  sectr revenue
in India (see  Table  4).  However,  the annual  license  is aften assigned  to local government  for
whom  it may be a significant  revenue  source. For example,  in Indonesia,
Table 4:  Revenue  Yield  from Registration  and Annual  Taxes
on Motor Vehicles
Percent  Percent of Total
Coun  rn  of GDP  Transport  Tax
1. Argentina  1987  0.1  4.9
2.  Ghana  1987  0.0  4.32
3. Guatemala  1988  0.1  6.5
4.  India  1988  0.4  19.0
S. Indonesia  1980  '0.1  n.a.
6. Jamaica  1984  0.3  1.1
7. Nepal  1985  0.1  6.7
B. Tanzania  1986  0.2  9.2
the annual  license  accounts  for 20 percent  of all local  government  transport  tax revenue  (which
itself accounts  for nearly half of all the revenue  raised  by local government).  The automatic
revenue-income  elasticity  of the  annual  vehicle  tax  depends  on base  elasticity  - whether  vehicle
numbers grow faster than GNP - and on the administration's  ability to register vehicles.
Automatic  revenue  -elasticity  of GNP (E) l/n is the ratio  of the percent  change  in revenue  (net
J2/  It is apprepriae  to consder  registration  fe and annud  tax together.  The enforcement  of the annual  tax is very
much  dependet  on rcgiston  saics,  and th  adminitaton of each  (and  perhaps  of he  tax  on  the  Urnsfr of
used  vehicle) often  overlaps.  The regisation fee also  may  be considered  a copilized form  of to  annul tax.
As noted  below,  Indit is considering  convetng its annual  tax to a one  te  payment.
ly  Peonal  property  tax is not an uncommon  practice  in indusial countries.  For exaiiple,  it is levied  in sveral
American  Stae.28
of any discretionary  actions), to the percent change in GNP.  Since motor vehicles  are subject
to annual tax on a specific rate tasis, the rate elasticity (E,) is the ratio of the percent change
in revenue (R) to the percent change in vehicles (V) numbers.  A rate elasticity greater than
unity means there is faster growth in vehicles subject to a higher tax rate.  The base elasticity
(Eb) is the ratio of the percent change in vehicle numbers to the percent change in GNP.  The
total elasticity is the product,
E  =  )  (EJ.
90.  Expectations  that base elasticity  might be a source of revenue growth are supported  by
little evidence. A recent review of motor vehicle demand in Guatemala  reports that it is highly
income elastic, increasing at a substantially  more rapid rate than GNP.  Rate elasticity, as
defined here,  will be unity if  tax rate is  stated in  specific terms, or  about unity if  rate
differentials  are small, or if all vehicle classes are growing at about the same rate.
91.  In practice, revenue growth seems to be dependent  on discretionary change in the tax
rates, but evidence on the effectiveness  of tax rate increases  is mixed. In Ghana, it is reported
that after a sharp increase in the annual license fee, the collection rate dropped by 40 percent.
On the other hand, in the Yugoslavian  republics, the license fee has been raised six or eight
times since 1986 with no fear of reducing  collection efficiency.
92.  Though the registration fee produces  revenue for some  local governments,  it is primarily
a regulatory instrunent.  The registration fee facilitates the yearly inspection  of vehicles for
safety  and/or insurance  coverage, as a record of the growth  in vehicle  numbers it also facilitates
road planning  and vehicle control.  Registration  fee administration  is usually separate from that
of the annual license, and is often a responsibility  of the police (as in Ghana).
93.  Rate. base and administration.  The annual license tax is complicated  and difficult to
administer. It reaches a broad and growing  base, but usually with a very low specific  rate, and
minimal revenue yield. As is the case with other taxes, recordkeeping  for the annual license is
usually poor; enforcement of the tax is weak, and penalties for non-compliance  are low; and
enforcement  costs are high.  The chief virtue of the annual license tax as a revenue instrument
seems to be its wide availability  - an important characteristic for financially strapped local
governments.
94.  In India, thougb the annual  license tax is generally  governed  by a federal act, rate setting
and administration  are left to the states.  The result is great variation in rates and in choice of
a base.  State governments  tax vehicles  according to weight, to flat rates, to engine capacity, to
carrying capacity, to types of tires, to  whether or  not they are diesel-driven, or  to  some
combination  of these. There are also state registrations  (valid forever, even if state of residence29
or business location changes),  driver's licenses, change  of ownership  fees, an annual city wheel
tax, and national permits for interstate trade.
95.  For enforcement, India's state governments  use mobile squads with the power to stop
vehicles and inspect documents.  These squads may levy fines, and in  some cases suspend
registration and permits.  Yet, the evasion  rate is high.  It is estimated  that 30 to 40 percent of
private vehicles and two-wheelers  do not pay.  Reasons for non-payment  are a low fine, a high
compliance cost, and a low probability of detection.  Conversely, only about 2 percent of
commercial  vchicles are thought to be delinquent, in part because of a heavier fine and more
frequent roadside checks.
96.  A similar situation holds for the provincial and the municipal annual license tax in
Argentina.  Here it is estimated that about 30 percent of all vehicles  are unlicensed  and up to
60 percent of the annual license tax is evaded. The reasons are similar to those cited for India.
Compliance  cost is high in that all documentation  regarding ownership  and registration must be
in order before payment of the annual tax may be made.  Moreover, enforcement  is sporadic.
If evasion is  detected, individuals may make retroactive payment and some consideration
payment  to the detecting  authorities.  There is no penalty for failing to register a vehicle. The
issue of high compliance  cost also arises in Nepal, where it is estimated that total cost to payers
is equal to about 6 percent of the annual revenue collected (Louis Berger, 1987, p.  46).  In
Bolivia, it is estimated  that about 20 separate transactions  are necessary  to register a vehicle -
a prerequisite for the annual license. The annual vehicle  capital tax has a collection cost equal
to 5 percent of revenue collected and a collection efficiency  of only 60 percent.
97.  The license tax payment  ratio in Nepal is 65 percent for cars, 55 percent for trucks, and
80 percent for buses.  The budget of the annual license division  in Ghana  is equal to 12 percent
of revenue collected from the annual tax,  but evasion is equal to  more than one-third of
collection. The tax is simple  - it is levied at a flat rate - but enforcement  is lax.
98.  Yugoslavia is a special case.  The annual license tax is levied separately  and at widely
different  rates, by three levels of government. There is relatively  little effective  recordkeeping.
Yet authorities report (but cannot statistically  verify) no evasion, asserting that enforcement  is
sufficient.  Police involvement means a high probability of detection and a severe penalty.
However, avoidance  is reported: some individuals  purchase their licenses in other republics  or
municipalities  to avoid a high tax at home.
Tax on the Movement  of Goods  and Passengers
99.  Taxes on the movement  of goods and passengers  can generate significant  revenue. The
most important is octroi, a tax levied on goods entering a city for local processing or final30
consumption.A Octroi  is found  in many  of the local  jurisdictions  in India, Pakistan,  Nepal,
and until 1981,  Bangladesh.  In Calcutta  the octroi  was  introduced  by the state  government  for
the entire metropolitan  area, with its revenue  to be shared  among  the various  local  bodies  and
the Calcutta  Metropolitan  Development  Authority. Despite  the revenue  success  enjoyed  by
octroi in India and Pakistan,  there are strong movements  to abolish  it.  The Indian  states  of
Gujarat, Karnataka, and Madhya Pradesh, have abolished  octroi.  Further, it has been
condemned  regularly  by analysts  of local  government  finance,  including  numerous  commissions
established  by the Government  of India (Bahl  and Linn, forthcoming,  Chapter  8).  A major
problem  is that  octroi  may  greatly  increase  transport  time  and costs,  and may  therefore  increase
the price  of imported  goods. The  magnitude  of time  lost is exemplified  by the Mysore  Taxation
Enquiry  estimate  that "between  Bangalore  and Mangalore,  about  800 km, a vehicle  has to stop
for 36 hours  and 40 minutes  at checkposts."
100.  The octroi base is the value, the weight, or the number of items entering  a local
jurisdiction.  In Bombay,  the tax  is imposed  according  to value  for some  commodities,  according
to weight  for others,  and on a specific  basis  for  oil entering  the city via a pipeline. In Karachi,
the tax  is imposed  according  to weight  for commodities  entering  by road,  but according  to value
for  commodities  entering  via the city's  port. Rates  vary  according  to complicated  schedules,  and
some  goods  and commodities  in transit  are exempt. The tax is collected  by clerks  at octroi
stations:  These  are located  at checkpoints  on roads  at  jurisdictional  borders,  at railroad  stations,
at airports,  and at docks. In Ahmadabad,  India  (a city of over 2 million),  there were 34 octroi
stations  in the 1970s  - 18 rail checkpoints,  15 road checkpoints,  and 1 air checkpoint.  There
is usually  no assessment  problem  when  the levy is specific;  however,  an invoice  is required.
Ahmadabad  assessors  are equipped  with  a manual  of market  values  for  double-checking  invoiced
amounts  (Bahl  and Linn, forthcoming).
101.  Other  problems  with the octroi, such  as spoilage  of merchandise  and bribery  of octroi
staff,  occur  frequently.  Nanjundappa  (1973)  estimated  that  in India  delays  to vehicles  at border
crossings  reduced  annual  vehicle  utilization  and increased  variable  vehicle  operating  costs by
approximately  25 percent.  Not all of this cost can be directly  ascribed  to octroi, but the
magnitude  of the figure  indicates  a considerable  loss in efficiency.
102.  Octroi therefore gives locally produced commodities  a  pricing advantage over
commodities  imported  from outside the metropolitan  area.  Octroi may curtail even intra-
metropolitan  trade if a metropolitan  area has grown beyond the boundaries  of the taxing
jurisdiction. As a final irony, the tax can provide a cogent disincentive  for metropolitan
integration  under  an area-wide  authority  - consolidation  of fragmented  local  authorities  would
&I  Pats of the diion  on octroi is taken  fiom Roy Bahl and  Johannes  Linn, Urban  Public Funance  and
Administraton  in Doveloning  Countries,  (forthcoming).31
automatically  reduce  the  octroi  tax  base  by detaxing  intra-metropolitan  commodity  flows. From
the standpoint  of efficiency,  octroi  is an unmitigated  C.saster.
103.  In terms  of tax equity,  the situation  is more  complicated  and depends  on local  practice.
In the cities  of Pakistan,  attempts  have  been  made  to structure  the tax so that it falls heavily  on
luxury  items  rather than  on food  and other essentials. In Ahmadabad  and Bombay,  where  the
rate structure  was less progressive,  octroi  was probably  more  regressive  than state sales  tax.
104.  In view of its many  problems  - high administration  cost; considerable  road transport
delays;  unknown,  but probably  poor collection  efficiency;  and collection  methods  that invite
corruption  - why does octroi  continue  to be used  by local government  in South  Asia? First,
octroi  can produce  substantial  local government  revenue. In many  Indian  and Paldstani  cities,
it dominates  the revenue  structure. For example,  in 1986  octroi  accounted  for 80 percent  of
total  tax in Karachi  and  was 70 percent  of total  tax in Ahmadabad  in 1984. In aggregate,  octroi
still accounts  for more  than one-third  of all local  government  revenue  in India.
105.  Octroi  is also  a highly  buoyant  revenue  source. Between  1979  and 1986,  octroi  revenue
in Karachi  increased  by 239 percent  compared  with a 124 percent  increase  for property  tax.
Between  1977  and 1984  the respective  revenue  increases  in Ahmadabad  were 199  percent  and
49 percent. This buoyancy  is caused  in part by automatic  growth  in the base  as inter-city  trade
expands  in value  and volume. It is caused  also  by local  government  efforts  to increase  revenue
by raising  and restructuring  octroi  rates.
106.  A second  reason  for  continued  reliance  on octroi  is the  absence  of a sufficient  atternative.
Other  forms  of taxation,  such  as automobile  tax, income  tax, sales  tax, and road user  charges,
are of only minor importance  to the revenue structure  of cities in India and Pakistan.1V
Insufficient  grants  or subsidies  from  the central  and state  governments  of India  and Pakistan  also
contribute  to local government  reliance  on octroi. Octroi  is the only major  tax base (besides
property)  not claimed  by the higher-level  authorities.  In Bangladesh,  and in those  Indian  states
where  octroi  was abolished,  it was not replaced  by an equally  productive  and buoyant  revenue
source.?' And, in India and Pakistan  the octroi  is more  politicaly  acceptable  than road user
charges.
If/  Recent  proposals  have centered  on the enby  f4  a * replacement. Thi  tax would be collected  fiom sellers  as an
ad valorem  rate  against  goods  importd from  ousie  the taxng  jursdiction.  It does eliminate  the octroi
cheokposs,  but  till has the undesirable  fure  of discrimiatin aginst  goods  that  are not localy produced,  and
imposing  a substantial  administrive burden.  Nath (1988)  provides a helpful  discussion.
17/  Schroeder  (1989)  reports that  the octoi was replacod  by a compenating grnt in Bangladesh,  but that  the grnt
was neither  equal in yield, nor was it as buoyant.32
107.  Besides  octroi, some Indian local authorities  levy a vehicle  and passenger  entrance
charge. Cities  in other  countries  have  comparable  charges,  but these  appear  to be linked  mainly
to the provision  of public  bus terminal  facilities  (for example,  in Indonesia  and Jamaica),  and
to the airport  departure  tax.  In the evaluation  of an entrance  charge,  one must distinguish
between  tax related  to road transport  and tax related  to air travel.
108.  A public  bus terminal  tax is efficient  if it covers  the marginal  cost imposed  by each  bus
or passenger  using  the station. If terminal  tax  exceeds  the marginal  cost,  it will  introduce  a bias
in favor  of private  automobiles  and reduce  bus passenger  traffic. The extent  of such  a loss in
efficiency  depends  on price elasticity  of demand  for inter-city  transport. There  is little  reason
to use this tax base, even  if elasticity  is low and efficiency  loss is minimal. It is narrow  and
subject  to fluctuations,  administration  is difficult,  and revenue  is negligible.  Higher  automotive
taxation  is  a better  alternative  on  grounds  of efficiency  and revenue-raising.  Automotive  taxation
is also lilcely  to be less regressive,  since higher-income  people  tend to use motor  vehicles,
whereas  lower-income  people  often  are restricted  to public  transportation.
109.  In a number  of countries  foreign  vehicles  are charged  for their  period  of stay. This is
a minor source of revenue  in YugoslaviaPls,  and in Nepal, where it is primarily  a tax on
commercial  vehicles  with  Indian  registration.  In Tanzania,  this tax  is levied  at a flat  rate on cars
(payable  in $US)  for a short  term  permit,  but commercial  vehicles  pay a variable  fee according
to truck size.  For the amount  of revenue  raised, the system  is complicated  and provides
considerable  incentive  for evasion.
110.  A number  of minor taxes/licenses  are levied on the movement  of goods  and people.
India  and Nepal  charge  a goods  or rowe permit  tax on commercial  vehicles  - either  on a per
kilometer  basis or as an annual  fee.  Other examples  are a special tax on heavy loads in
Yugoslavia,  a provincial  commercial  route license fee in Indonesia,  and a fee for driver's
licenses  in all countries. These  charges  are levied primarily  for regulation  rather than for
revenue.
111.  A related  case  is the administration  of airport  charges  in Tanzania.  Three  sets  of charges
are levied: (1) a fee for airport  use; (2) a passenger  departure  service  charge;  and (3) a civil
aviation  fee for  regulation  and certification  of aircraft,  pilots,  and mechanics.  The  total  amount
due in 1986  was equal  to about 10 percent  of total  road user tax in that year. However,  only
about 53 percent  of the amount  due was actually  collected  (an estimated  63 percent  from the
landing  and parking  fee, 51 percent  from the passenger  departure  fee, and 30 percent  from  the
civil  aviation  fee). The  reasons  cited  for the poor  revenue  collection  are lack  of incentive  (there
IV/  In Yugoslivia,  the  procecds  ar  distributed  among  the republics  according  to main  road  mileage  in each.33
is no relationship  between  amount  c-illected  and airport  expenditure),  and a lack of adequate
control  procedures.
Toml
112.  Tolls  are viewed  as a control  on urban traffic  or as a revenue  instrument. In LDCs,
however,  toll systems  may  not be effective. Tolls  are not generally  an appropriate  instrument
for congestion  pricing.  For a toll system  to work, roadway  entry and exit points must be
limited. With the exception  of a few limited-access  expressways,  this is typically  not the case
for congested  urban streets.  Further, toll collection  is costly to administer  and may itself
contribute  to congestion  by creating  a bottleneck  at the tollgate.  New electronic  metering
systems avoid this problem, but the technology  is too complicated  for most low income
countries. As a revenue  source,  tolls  may  be adequate  for  financing  bridges,  tunnels,  or special
urban  expressways,  but probably  not road systems.
113.  Compared  with other  road user charges,  tolls do not generate  much  revenue  in LDCs,
and their  administrative  cost  appears  to be luigh.  Yugoslavia  has the most  extensive  national  toll
road financing  system  of the countries  studied. Tolls generate  about 18 percent  of total  road
user charge revenue, with responsibility  for the system divided  between  central and local
(republic)  government.  The ex-,rience of one contractor,  operating  a section  of the Beigrade
roadway, is that collection  cost equals about one-third  of total revenue collected.  The
government  estimates  that  evasion  and operator  errors  cost  approximately  6 percent  of potential
revenue.
114.  Tanzania  also  has an extensive  toll road system. Toll  stations  are located  at 13  points
around  the nation, and generate  about 3.5 percent  of total road user charge  revenue. The
collection  rate is only  60 percent,  owing  to the corruption  that  stems  from  poor  financial  controls
and collectors'  low wages. The  poor financial  control  is due to monitoring  difficulty  at remote
stations  and to the absence  of any way  to accurately  check  the amount  of vehicle  traffic. It has
been  suggested  that the toll system  be replaced  by an increase  in the fuel tax. The  proposal  has
the merit of  easier administration  and a  100 percent collection  rate, but the (political)
disadvantage  of affecutng  the price of gasoline.
115.  Bolivia  makes  heavy  use of tolls  as a revenue  source. There  are 48 toll stations  on inter-
urban  roads. Tolls  collected  account  for 6 percent  of total  road user charges,  even though  the
collection  rate is only  about 60 percent. Evasion  is largely  attributed  to the abuse  of power  by
toll booth  operators. One estimate  places  the additional  income  of toll booth  operators  at six
times  the national  average  income. Compliance  cost  is extremely  high  - it is estimated  that the
value  of time lost waiting  to pay toll is four times  the revenue  collected.34
116.  In most  countries,  tolls  are related  to financing  a specific  road  or bridge  project,  or they
are imposed  on limited-access  roads  and bridges. Tolls  tend  to be a minor  revenue  source,  and
may  or may  not be earmarked  for roadway  expenditure.  In India,  for example,  tolls  on national
roads  are paid  to the national  government  general  account,  less  a 12  percent  collection  fee,  while
tolls  on certain  state  roads  or bridges  are dedicated  to financing  those  facilities. Administrative
problems  seem to be common. The collection  rate is reported  to be about 40 percent  on toll
roads  and bridges  in Ghana,  because  of undercollection  due to e4uipment  failure  and fVbmwal
exemptions  by collectors. In Argentina,  where  use of tolls is minimal,  evasion  is thought  to be
high because  of the toll booth operators'  low salaries,  and because  of the absence  of toll
collection  monitoring.0
12/  The collection  rate  in Hong  Kong  is 99  perct  where  the tolls  are elctronically  administ.35
IV.  REFORM  OPrIONS
117.  The transport  sector  has high untapped  revenue  potential. The level  of transport  tax is
equal  to 1.7 percent  of the GDP in the 20 countries  compared. The individual  percentage  can
vary greatly. The effective  tax rate in Argentina  and in Costa  Rica  is over 3 percent.
118.  Many of the administrative  reforms necessary  to increase  revenue intake from the
transport sector are feasible and are within the capabilities  of most LDC tax authorities.
However,  the revenue  impact  from  these  actions  alone  will  not  lead  to full  realization  of revenue
potential. The big returns are from the combination  of administrative  and policy changes.
Simplification  of the tax structure  will  make  administration  easier  and  in some  cases  will  reduce
the incentive  for evasion. It is broadening  the tax base and rationalizing  the rate structure  that
will increase  revenue  most  significantly.  However,  such  changes  are not easy  since  many  of the
current  polices were  put in place  to satisfy  other macroeconomic  and political  objectives.  For
example:
*  Motor fuel pricing  is controlled  for political  and equity  reasons,  with  the result
that gasoline  is subsidized  rather  than taxed  in some  countries;
*  Automobile  sales  tax is driven  by foreign  exchange  and equity  concerns,  as well
as by revenue  considerations;
*  Automobile  registration  has primarily  a regulatory  goal;
*  Customs  corruption  is so institutionalized  in some  countries  that it is almost  a
national  policy.
Thus,  strengthening  transport  sector  taxation  depends  on tradeoffs  between  good  transport  sector
taxation  and these  macro  policies.
119.  The best methods  for improving  transport  sector  taxation  are reviewed  below. Two
themes  underlie  this discuLsson.  First, policy  and administrative  reforms  must  go together;  the
tax structure must be corrected before the administration  can be  redesigned.  Second,
governments  should  design  policies  that increase  the expected  cost of evasion  and reduce  the
incentives  to non-compliance.
IT  Rate Iz&cJ
120.  High tax rates provide  the incentive  to evade  or to avoid tax payment. They invite
corruption  of public officials by making bribery viable, and they encourage  smuggling.
Increasing  tax rates  may also  cause  consumers  or producers  to curtail  activity  to a point  where
revenue  is actualy reduced. A key  question  is whether  transport  tax and road  user  charges  can
be reduced  without  compromising  economic  policy,  and if rates  were lowered,  would  the gain
be equal  to the economic  policy  cost?36
121.  The price of motor fuel is the central issue.  The real motor fuel tax rate should be
viewed  as the ratio of revenue collected  to taxable  sales valued  at a non-subsidized  level. Using
this calculation, the tax rate on motor fuel is very low in many developing  countries  and negative
in some.  Fuel is often subsidized  because of perceptions  of equity, general price impacts, and
the potential  political cost of allowing  the fuel price to rise.
122.  Bearing in mind the reasons for the present motor fuel taxation system, what would be
gained from increasing  the real fuel tax rate?
*  The amount of gas tax revenue would  increase in proportion to price elasticity  of
demand for  motor fuel.  To the  extent reduced truck hauling and private
automobile use curtailed gasoline consumption - by  taking the place of rail
shipment  and public transportation  - revenue from all taxes on motor vehicles
would be reduced.
A foreign exchange gain could be realized in oil-importing  countries.
*  There would  be a general shift of national  resources away from transport to other
sectors of the economy.
*  The return from smuggling  lower priced fuel across national boundaries would
be reduced or eliminated. Other anomalies  associated  with low fuel prices might
also be corrected. For example, in Tanzania, carrying fuel to the countryside  is
not profitable, because transportation  costs outweigh the fuel-carrying  gain.
3  Motor fuel tax collection  rate is virtually 100  percent, with low administrative  and
compliance  costs.  The shift to higher motor fuel tax (and presumably  to lower
tax on something  else), is thus a gain in adminis  aMYc  efficiency.
123.  Tax rates on the purchase of motor vehicles and parts are another pricing issue.  The
reasons for the high rates typical  in most developing  countries  are: (1) automobiles  are a luxury
and a differentially  higher tax rate on their purchase is progressive;  (2) high tax rates discourage
automobile consumption  and redirect consumer savings into more productive investments;  (3)
the country may benefit  from less congestion,  foreign  exchange  savings, reduced use of imported
motor fuel, and less demand for public investment in roadways; and (4) motor vehicles -
imported or domestically  produced  - are easily reached by the tax administration  system, and
in that sense are an easy source of revenue.
124.  There is  no compelling argument for lowering tax rates on  the purchase of  motor
vehicles.  It is true that evasion incentives increase with higher rates, especially if detection
probability is low or if the penalty is not severe. Evasion is relatively easy in Central American
countries, where overland entry from an automobile  producing country is possible.  But this
probably argues less for a reduction  in rates than for a tightening  of administration. Conversely,37
some countries (such as Ghana), already have very  low motor vehicle tax rates and can
potentially  realize greater revenue from the transport sector.
125.  The annual license tax and the registration fee on  motor vehicles are a  third issue
concerning  rates.  On the one hand, there are arguments, such as in Ghana, that increases  in the
annual license tax reduce compliance.  There are real costs to a reduction in compliance,
including  a loss of control over safety inspections,  automobile  insurance, information  about the
motor vehicle fleet, and checks  on ownership transfers. Yet there is evidence  (such as in India),
that a higher rate (accompanied  by proper enforcement),  can increase compliance. In either
case, the rate levels are low on the annual license tax and on the registration fee, making it
questionable that the tax  rate makes much difference in  the decision to  pay.  One other
consideration  is important: some local governments  derive a substantial  share of their revenue
from such taxes and fees.  Lower rates would compromise  their financial  position.
126.  High rates are not a major problem underlying  the failure of transport to realize its full
revenue potential.  The most important  base - motor fuel - is probably undertaxed  in most
countries, and a rate increase could likely be absorbed with little, if any, loss in collection
efficiency. The switcn to an ad valorem rate could preserve the gas tax revenue position, and
spare governments from periodically having to raise rates.  To discourage smuggling, motor
vehicle  tax rates might be lowered  for sales tax purposes. However, enforcement  is a better way
of discouraging  evasion.  Someone  who evaded a high tax rate is not likely to comply simply
because the rate has been halved.  For the other forms of transport tax, the rates/charges  are
presendy so low that it seems unlikely  compliance  will be affected by further reductions.
TM  I  mm  t  Uniormiy
127.  A broad tax base with few exemptions  and a single  rate offer the best possibilities  for tax
enfxui.cment  and  the  fewest avenues for avoidance.  Rate differentiation and exemptions
introduce  nonuniformity. A nonuniform  tax system  gives payers an opportunity  to avoid taxation
by changing or appearing to change production or consumption. Decreases in the uniformity
of a tax system increase the gap between actual tax collection  and revenue potential.
128.  This  is  not  to  say  there  should be  no  rate  differentiation in  transport taxation.
Differential  rates and a program of exemptions  are common, and exist for important reasons.
Some of the most common  are:
*  A higher tax rate for petrol than diesel;
*  Motor fuel tax  exemption for government, agriculture, and other preferred
sectors;
*  Preferential import duty and sales tax treatment for government, commercial
companies, diplomats, vehicles purchased for foreign-financed  projects, and
small, fuel efficient cars;
*  Government  vehicles  exempted  from tolls;38
Higher  taxation  on goods  in transit  than on those  locally  produced.
129.  The differential  tax treatment  of motor  fuels,  leading  to various  pump  prices  for diesel,
premium,  and regular  petrol  has  two consequences.  First, it appears  to encourage  adulteration.
However,  this form of evasion  can often  be controlled  through  fuel coloration,  or the use of
special  additives. Second,  the lower  charge  for  diesel  fuel benefits  the group  of users  imposing
the greatest  cost on highway  use.  Equity  is the justification  for this rate differentiation.  A
higher  price  for  gasoline  subsidizes  diesel  consumption  (and  therefore  public  transportation),  and
home  fuels, such  as kerosene. The problems  with differential  rates for motor  fuels are well-
known: some  private  automobiles  use diesel;  some  public  transportation  is fueled  by gasoline;
diesel  powered  vehicles  may  be fueled  by kerosene;  cheaper  road  transport  charges  discriminate
against  the rail system  and  impose  a high  cost  on road  maintenance;  and gasoline  prices  may  be
set below  market  prices  (meaning  that the subsidy  runs to diesel,  to home  heating,  and to the
entire  road sector).
130.  It is difficult  to justify  the lower  price and the lower tax rate on diesel. It is not clear
that equity is  achieved, revenue is lost, and subsidizing  the largest beneficiary  of  road
expenditure  (per mile)  is inefficient. This is another  case where  politics  are pammount.
131.  The octroi  in India  is an important  differential  tax. It imposes  a tax on goods  in transit,
but not on goods  produced  within  local  jurisdictional  boundaries. As discussed  earlier, octroi
encourages  evasion  and avoidance.  The high  compliance  cost  and subjective  assessment  method
encourage  pay offs to evade  tax.  To avoid  tax, business  activity  has begun  to develop  outside
jurisdictional  boundaries.  These  are only  a few  of the flaws  associated  with  octroi,  but  give the
flavor  of what  is wrong.
132.  Finally, too many exemptions  are a major  source  of nonuniformity.  The greater the
number  of exempt categories  and the higher the rate on taxed categories,  the greater the
probability  of evasion  and avoidance. The  exemption  of small-engine  cars from  import  duty  in
Ghana,  and the exemption  of commercial  vehicles  from  import  duty  in Indonesia  are examples
of an incentive  for misdeclaration.  Government  exemptions  from  vehicle  tax from motor  fuel
tax, and even from toils is common.  Such exemptions  form an incentive  for government
overuse  of transport  services  and for  the transference  of special  treatment  to other  sectors. They
invite  abuse  and provide  uncertain  equity  and efficiency  gains.
Mm  ctur  Simm  o
133.  Complex  tax systems increase tax administration  cost, weaken tax administration
effectiveness,  and impose  a high compliance  cost on taxpayers. In short, complexity  incites
evasion,  lowers  the probability  of detection,  and reduces  transport  tax collection. The high
compliance  cost  imposed  on taxpayers  is usually  due to the outside  help needed,  to the onerous
bookkeeping  requirements,  or to the inordinate  amount  of time spent  paying the tax.  High
compliance  cost results  in increased  tax avoidance  or tax evasion.39
134.  The complicated  tariff structure  in most  low-income  countries  involves  numerous  rates
and classifications  for goods. The  great amount  of time  customs  officials  must spend  on goods
classification  costs time that could  be spent  on more  productive  activities,  such as valuation.
Complicated  tariff structures  also  lower  the probability  of detection  for importers  undervaluing
goods,  and create  more  avenues  for goods  reclassification  and lower  duties. A structure  with
only a few rates  and classifications  would  close  these  avenues.
135.  Sales  tax also could  be simplified,  but this may  involve  tradeoffs  with other  objectives
of tax reform. Excise  tax, which  generally  is levied  on a specific  rather than an ad valorem
basis, is probably  the easiest  of the indirect  taxes  to administer.  Its assessment  and collection
are easily  controlled,  since  the tax is levied  when  a good  is moved. However,  because  excise
is levied at an early stage of the production  process, it cascades  forward  and creates price
distortions. A manufacturer's  sales tax generally  is levied on an ad valorem  basis and is
therefore  elastic. The tax is relatively  easy to administer,  but is subject  to the same  cascading.
The more  modem  approaches  to general  sales  tation  are the value-added  tax or the retail  sales
tax.  Of the countries  in this sample,  Yugoslavia  and India  make  some  use of a retail  sales  tax
on automobile  purchases;  Argentina  and  Bolivia  use a value-added  tax on automobile  purchases;
the other  countries  impose  a sales tax on imports  or use a manufacturer's  sales  tax.
136.  The Indian,  Pakistani,  and Nepalese  octroi  is a form of sales  tax that is complicated  and
difficult  to administer. Some  of the studies  on octroi  propose  replacing  it with  an equal  yield
tax on motor  fuel, which  would  simplify  the local  tax system. Other  studies  propose  an entry
tax, which would  place a sales tax surcharge  on goods  not locally  produced;  or a business
property  tax.  Neither  of these  taxes  would  make  the system  any less complex.
137.  Most  countries  have  some  sort of sales  tax on the transfer  of used  vehicles.  This is often
a local government  tax, such  as in Indonesia.  Transfer  tax on used  automobiles  brings  in little
revenue,  is notoriously  difficult  to administer,  and is often  complicated.
138.  Finally, the most complicated  tanwport sector charges are the license tax and the
registration  fee. The administration  of these  charges  requirs following  a long procedure,  and
involves  a lot of manual  checldng. The simplification  of the license  tax and the system  of the
registration  fee is beginning.  Proposed  and actual changes in administrative  practice are
described  below.
Do Inc  MilOl!
139.  In theory  a tapayer is more  willing  to pay if a visible  benefit  is attached  to the tax or
charge, and if there is no free ride.  In this case, tax rates may be set higher with the
expectation  of a corresponding  increase  in rates. This  leads  to the question  of whether  collection
in the transport  sector  could  be increased  by earmarling  road user taxation  entirely  to benefit
road users.40
140.  From data presented in the case studies, there i- no evidence that collection efficiency
is higher in countries where road user taxation covers a greater share of roadway cost (or that
collection efficiency is lower where road user taxation covers more than full roadway cost).
Basic causes of  evasion and  avoidance come from within the  tax  structure and  the  tax
administration  - areas that must be improved before developing  a program that will stimulate
a greater willingness to pay for road use.
141.  There is another way to look at the incentives argument.  Earmarking taxes may not
increase willingness  to pay, but it may increase willingness  to collect.  The collection authority
at  Tanzania's  airport  saw no  relationship between the  amount of  tax  collected and  the
expenditure  allocation for airport services.  In India, interstate cooperation  in the collection  of
motor vehicle sales tax faces face a similar problem - the policing state may receive none of
the benefits of the increased enforcement.
Complince  Cost
142.  The question of motor fuel taxation, which usually  has a 100  percent collection rate,  is
whether governments can base proposals for raising gasoline tax on a user benefits argument.
The answer, from Table 1, implies it would  be difficult  to sell. Motor fuel tax already accounts
for a substantial  share of road expenditure  in most of the countries considered.
143.  Tax payment  will be resisted  when the cost of compliance  is high. Procedures, including
recordkeeping  (as with India's  modified value added program), may be too complicated, or
corruption may invite noncompliance. Compliance  costs for motor fuel tax and excise taxes on
motor vehicle production are lower than for other charges.
144.  Corruption  effects several types of charges.  In terms of the amount of money  involved,
import duty on automobiles  is probably the biggest problem.  Tolls are a problem because of
the lack of toll booth operator supervision. In Bolivia the cost of compliance  (measured  in time
lost), was as much as four times the revenue collected. There is no satisfactory  solution to the
toll problem for low-income countries.  Electronic metering devices can solve some of the
evasion problems.  The substitution  of a general tax for tolls, as proposed in Tanzania, is a
solution to the administration  problem, but it fails to charge users for the cost of a particular
road service.
145.  The registration fee and annual license tax impose a heavy time cost on those who
comply. Numerous forms must be filled  out and the taxpayer  must demonstrate  compliance  with
seveal  other regulations.  Such cross-checking is a  good enforcement instrument, but is
burdensome  enough to discourage tax compliance. The payment rate is low in most countries.
However, the annual license tax will continue  to be levied - it is an available  source of revenue
and is levied on an expanding  base.41
146.  To simplify  these charges  and reduce  compliance  and admli  Aation  costs,  a one-time
payment  has  been  proposed  by several  Indian  states. Under  this  prograi  -, private  vehicle  owners
would  pay a lifetime  annual  charge  at the time of registration.2w  This approach  dramaticaly
reduces  compliance  and administrative  costs  and, when  imposed  in relation  to the value  of the
vehicles,  a higher  rate may seem  less objectionable.  The lifetime  charge  does  have  important
flaws: (1) data from  the annual  license  tax could  no longer  be used  as a record  of the number
of vehicles  on the road; (2)  the annual  license  tax could  no longer  be used  to force  the recording
of ownership  changes;  and (3) without  the annual  license  tax, it would  not be as easy to do an
annual  check  on insurance  coverage. Another  problem  is that the cost  of this program  would
be prohibitive  for most commercial  vehicles. One-time  payment  would  probably  have  to be
limited  to private  automobiles  and two-wheelers.  Thus, some  of the potential  administrative
savings  would  not be realized.
147.  A suggested  approach  to annual  license  tax simplification  in Tanzania  was to reduce  the
number  of vehicle  categories  in the tax structure  and to reduce  the tax rate.  Unification  of
several  permit, license,  and registration  certificates  was recommended  for Nepal to reduce
compliance  cost and eliminate  some duplication  of administrative  effort.  Neither of these
proposals  was implemented.
148.  Some  inroads  to improved  administration  have  been  made  in Maharashtra  State  (India).
Records  on vehicle  registration  and licenses  have  been  computerized,  billings  are automatically
generated,  and delinquency  lists  are printed. To reduce  compliance  cost,  payment  may  be made
at banks.
149.  Several  other administrative  practices  provide  clues  that might  help improve  the annual
license  tax.  In Yugoslavia,  tough enforcement  appears  to generate  a lower evasion  rate.  In
India, where enforcement  is tougher  on commercial  vehicles  than on private vehicles,  the
evasion  rate on the commercial  vehicles  is much  lower. Ghana's  flat rate tax, while  easy and
cheap  to administer,  may not be so appealing  from a benefits  point-of-view  (that  is, heavier
vehicles  should  pay more, and so on).
Enforcement  and Penalty
150.  Evasion  is discouraged  by a high  likelihood  of detection  and  by a severe  penalty. Of the
countries  in this sample,  Yugoslavia  seems  to have  concentrated  most  on the penalty  approach,
and little evasion  is reported  - even of the annual  license  tax, when  neither  a dated  number
plate nor a displayed  registration  sticker  is required. Success  could  be due to a no-nonsense
approach  to dealing  with evaders,  the fact that there is often little  personal  gain from evasion
in a socialist  state,  or simply  that the government's  statistics  are not accurate  enough  to identify
ZQI  Since 1987,  the Government  of Mahamshtra  has levied a one time charge on two-wheelers  and tricycles. Ouaat
and U.P. have adopted  the one time system  for personai  vehicles, and Tamil Nadu and  U.T. Delhi will introduce
this  system oon (Government  of India, 1989, Chapter  III).42
the amount  of evasion  occurring. In none of the other  countries  was penalty  reported  to be an
effective  deterrent.
151.  Most  efforts  to control  evasion  have  concentrated  on increasing  probability  of detection.
This requires improvements  in collection,  recordkeeping,  assessment  of tax liability, and
identification  of those  liable  to pay the tax.
Interfoveimmental  Relatiops
152.  In most  countries,  the decision  about  how  to divide  responsibility  for taxing  the transport
sector  between  central  and subnational  government  depends  on whether  there is a tradition  of
local  government  taxation. In India's federal  system,  where  there  is such  a tradition,  about  45
percent  of all road user  charges  accrue  to local government. Where  countries  operate  under
highly centralized  fiscal systems, local government  may not have well developed  tax
administration  systems.  Under  such  circumstances,  taxation  of the transport  sector  remains  with
the central  government.
153.  Most low-income  countries  are decentralizing  their revenue  systems  and are searching
for revenue  sources  that are appropriate  for administration  at the local level.  A first step in
evaluating  the feasibility  of local  level  transport  tax  is an identification  of the problems  that  have
ansen with local taxation  in general and with local transport  tax in particular.  The basic
problems  center  on the inability  of local government  to effectively  administer  transport  tax, the
difficulty  of inter-local  tax enforcement  cooperation,  and the case with which  local  residents  or
businesses  can legaUy  avoid  payment  by making  purchases  or sales in other  jurisdictions.
154.  From  this, and from  basic  principles  of multi-level  finance,  one might  offer the following
guidelines  for defining  a local government  role in transport sector taxation.  First, local
government  in developing  countries  can be most  effective  in taxing  road use and in controlling
vehicle  licensing  and  vehicle  registration.  Motor  vehicle  production  tax and  purchase  tax should
be left  to the central  government.  There  is no place  for the taxation  of goods  in transit  at either
level.  The taxation of  motor fuel presents a  special case.  Because  of macroeconomic
considerations  - revenue  needs, foreign  exchange  problems,  and the political  sensitivity  of
gasoline  prices  - tax on motor  fuel will continue  to be a central government  levy in most
developing  countries.  However,  there  is a case  for  local  government  sharing  in the  revenue,  and
even  for local  government  partaking  in the rate setting. The case  for allowing  local  government
participation  rests  on four factors: (1) motor  fuel  is a growing  tax base  related  to urbanization;
(2)  local  officials  will  have  an idea  what  is fair  and of urban  consumers'  willingness  to pay; (3)
local govemment  must bear part of the street  maintenance  and taffic control  costs associated
with more  vehicle  use; and (4)  responsibility  for pollution  and congestion  control  usually  rests
with  local government.43
155.  Second,  local or state  governments  in LDCs should  not have the authority  to choose
differenti rates  and bases. This  is not because  differendal  taxation  in different  regions  of the
country  is a bad idea, but because  local  administrators  may not be up to the job.  Where  local
governments  in India  have set differential  rates, leakages  have  occurred  because  of problems
arising  from interstate  trade. In Yugoslavia,  where  local government  is given similar  freedom
to set rates, a much  less severe  problem  with leakages  is reported.
156.  Third, it is useful to have some transport sector taxes administered  by the local
government.  Local  familiarity  and access  are important  to the identification  and assessment  of
certain  taxes, such  as tolls, vehicle  transfers,  and annual  licenses. The alternative  is a shared
tax system where central government  assumes responsibility  for  all or  most taxes on
automobiles,  and  in return  guarantees  local  government  a share  of the  proceeds. There  are some
problems  with this approach:
*  It does not enable  local governments  to tax road users at a higher  rate, when  a
higher  rate may  be needed,  for example,  in cities;
*  FamiLiarity  ;n the assessment  and  enforcement  process  is lost, for  example,  in the
identification  of those  liable  for  motor  vehicle  license  tax, and in the use offlying
squads  to enforce  licensing,  registration,  and the sale of special  permits;
D  The central  government  may withhold  or reduce  the local share of revenue,  a
problem  presently  being faced  in Argentina.44
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